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Abstract
This Note addresses the conflict within the U.S. Courts of Appeals regarding an alien’s right to
challenge the BIA’s administrative notice of a political change in an asylum seeker’s home country.
Part I of this Note discusses U.S. asylum law standards and the procedures that an applicant must
follow in seeking asylum and in appealing an adverse asylum decision. Part I also discusses the
origin of administrative notice, its application in immigration proceedings, and an alien’s right to
procedural due process. Part II examines circuit court decisions addressing whether an applicant
is denied due process when the BIA takes administrative notice of a change in the political situa-
tion in an alien’s home country without allowing the applicant an opportunity to respond before a
decision is rendered. Part III argues that current immigration procedures are inadequate and that
the current BIA practice violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution. This Note concludes that an alien should be warned before the BIA takes administrative
notice and permitted to challenge administratively noticed facts before the BIA renders a decision.
NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE, DUE PROCESS, AND THE
ADJUDICATION OF ASYLUM CLAIMS IN THE
UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
Aliens' are eligible for asylum in the United States if they
have been persecuted in the past or they have a well-founded
fear of persecution in their countries of origin because of their
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group.2 Aliens seeking asylum in the United
States commonly claim that they fear persecution by repressive
governments in their countries of origin if they return.' A
change of government in these countries, therefore, can affect
an alien's eligibility for asylum.4 If a repressive regime is re-
placed, aliens originally from that country may no longer possess
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (3) (1988). Under U.S. law, the term "alien" means any per-
son who is not a citizen or a national of the United States. Id. A national of the United
States is a person who owes permanent allegiance to the United States. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (21) (1988).
2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A). An alien physically present in the United States
or at a land border or port of entry may be granted asylum in the discretion of the
Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that the alien is a refugee within
the meaning of the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). A refugee is:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion ....
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A).
3. See, e.g., Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1020 (9th Cir. 1992) (Nicara-
guan citizens claiming persecution by Sandinista government); Baka v. INS, 963 F.2d
1376 (10th Cir. 1992) (Hungarian nationals claiming persecution by Communist gov-
ernment of Hungary); see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
65 (1979) (persecution normally related to action by authorities of country or by
segments of population tolerated by authorities).
4. See, e.g., Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 707 (10th Cir. 1991) (asylum request de-
nied after change in Polish government); Wojcik v. INS, 951 F.2d 172, 173 (8th Cir.
1991) (same). Asylum may be terminated after it has been granted because of a change
in the circumstances in an alien's home country. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b).
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a well-founded fear of persecution.5 U.S. immigration adjudica-
tors, who review aliens' requests for asylum, have noted changes
in the governments of the aliens' home countries in denying
these requests.6
A change, in the government of an alien's home country
may occur after an alien has supplied evidence to support his
request for asylum in the United States but before immigration
officials have made a decision on the request.7 In this instance,
the record of evidence upon which immigration officials will
base their decision will not include any evidence from the alien
on the significance of a recent change of government and its
impact on his asylum request.8 In many cases, aliens seeking asy-
lum contend that the change in government does not eliminate
the threat of persecution that they will face if returned to their
home country.9 The aliens argue that their persecutors have re-
tained positions of au'thority despite the change in leadership' °
and, therefore, the change in government has not eliminated
their well-founded fear of persecution."
5. See, e.g., Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.
113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993) (former member of Solidarity labor union found to no longer
possess well-founded fear of persecution after Solidarity election to coalition govern-
ment in Poland).
6. See, e.g., Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1022-23 (immigration appeals agency relied
on recent election results in concluding that aliens lacked well-founded fear of persecu-
tion).
7. See, e.g., Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1993) (immigration ap-
peals agency denied asylum request two years after oral argument and one year after
political changes in Ethiopia); Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1021 (immigration appeals
agency denied asylum request one year after appeal and six months after political
changes in Nicaragua).
8. See, e.g., Gebremichael, 10 F.3d at 32 (noting that political changes in Ethiopia
occurred after briefs received and oral argument held); Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at
1021 (noting that none of the parties "had occasion to develop a record about the
possibility that the Sandinistas might someday lose control").
9. See Stephanie Griffith, New INS Policy Alarms Area's Nicaraguan.s, WASH. PosT, July
31, 1990, at B5 (anti-Sandinista asylum applicants express fear over INS policy of de-
porting Nicaraguans after Sandinistas defeated in elections); Appellants' Opening Brief
at 12, Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 90-70618) (petitioners
fear that Sandinistas still have power to persecute them for political beliefs).
10. See Griffith, supra note 9, at B5 (quoting one Nicaraguan citizen seeking asy-
lum in United States as saying that despite election of new President in Nicaragua in
1990, "[t]he Sandinistas can still throw her out of the government in five minutes").
11. Id. Although the alleged persecutors in cases where the government has
changed are no longer part of the government, the statutory definition of a refugee
does not require that the persecution come from the refugee's own government. See 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A). The definition only specifies that the refugee be unwilling or
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The Board of Immigration Appeals (the "BIA"), the admin-
istrative appeals unit that decides appeals from the decisions of
lower immigration authorities, 12 has found that some aliens
from countries where the government has changed do not have
a well-founded fear of persecution. Despite the right of an alien
who has entered the United States to be heard on the evidence
concerning an asylum request,13 the BIA has denied asylum to
these aliens even though they have not had an opportunity to
address the change in government before the BIA rendered a
decision. 4 In addition, the BIA used nearly identical decisions
to deny asylum to a large numbers of these aliens,' 5 despite an
alien's right to an individualized determination of his asylum re-
unable to avail himself of the protection of his government because of a well-founded
fear of persecution. Id. U.S. courts have held that asylum may be granted when perse-
cution is at the hands of forces over which the government is unwilling or unable to
control. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984), amended, 767
F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that Salvadoran guerrillas are source of persecution);
McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that Provisional wing
of Irish Republican Army is source of persecution).
12. 8 C.F.R 3.1 (b) (1993). The BIA is an administrative appeals agency of the U.S.
Department of Justice that reviews, among other things, asylum decisions made by Im-
migration Judges ("IJs"-). Id. The Us, sometimes referred to as "Special Inquiry Of-
ficers," are responsible for deciding questions involving bond, exclusion, and deporta-
tion. RIcHARD A. BOSWELL, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALIY LAW 18 (2d ed. 1992). Both
IJs and the BIA are a part of the U.S. Department of Justice's Executive Office for
Immigration Review ("EOIR"), id. at 217, an entity separate from the INS and created
by the Attorney General in 1983. Id. at 7.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl, 4. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." Id. Aliens physically within the United States are "persons" within the
meaning of the U.S. Constitution, and are therefore entitled to the procedural due
process mandated by the Fifth Amendment. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21
(1982). An alien's procedural due process rights have been held to include an oppor-
tunity to be heard before removal from the United States. The Japanese Immigrant
Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903). Aliens not physically within the United States, often
referred to as excludable aliens, are not entitled to procedural due process beyond that
provided by immigration regulations. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 21.
This Note is limited to an analysis of the due process implications of BIA use of
administrative notice in deportation cases, rather than exclusion cases. But see Dhine v.
District Director, 818 F. Supp. 671, 677 (S.D.N.Y.) (BIA erred in exclusion case by tak-
ing administrative notice of disputable fact that there had been no persecution of Jews
in Ethiopia after fall of Mengistu regime), rev'd in part on other grounds, 3 F.3d 613 (2d
Cir. 1993).
14. See, e.g., de la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1095 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The
BIA did not give the Petitioners... an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence before
the appeal was dismissed.").
15. Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992). "The identical language
was used [by the BIA] in a large number of other cases, apparently as INS form language
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quest.16 The BIA has used the doctrine of administrative notice
to recognize these changes in the government of an alien's
home country.' 7
The doctrine of administrative notice, also known as official
notice, allows an administrative agency like the BIA to establish
the existence of facts without resorting to formal methods of
proof.'8 For example, the BIA took administrative notice of the
ouster of the repressive Sandinista Party in Nicaragua 9 and the
election of a non-Communist government in Poland soon after
these events occurred. 20 As a result, many of the aliens seeking
asylum before the BIA on the basis of their fear of persecution
by the Sandinistas in Nicaragua or the Communists in Poland
were rejected by the BIA.2'
The U.S. Courts of Appeals hear appeals from BIA deci-
sions.2 2 The circuit courts are divided on whether an applicant
for asylum is denied due process, in contravention of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, when the BIA takes ad-
ministrative notice of a change in government in the applicant's
home country without allowing the applicant an opportunity to
respond. 21 Specifically, these courts disagree on whether a mo-
for Nicaraguan cases after Violeta Chamorro won the Nicaraguan presidential elec-
tion." Id.
16. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).
17. See, e.g., Sarria-Sibaja v. INS, 990 F.2d 442, 443 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing use
of administrative notice by BIA to deny asylum after change in government in alien's
home country); Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Castillo-Villagra,
972 F.2d at 1022-23 (same).
18. 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 10.6, at 150 (3rd ed. 1994); 4JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 25.01, at 2
(1993). "A court or an agency can make a finding of fact without evidentiary support by
taking judicial or official notice, respectively, of that fact." 2 id.; see MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 359, at 1028-33 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3rd ed. 1984). With administrative
notice, an administrative law judge "bypasses the normal process of proof and relies
upon facts and opinions not supported by evidence 'on the record.'" Id. at 1028.
19. See, e.g., Sarria-Sibaja, 990 F.2d at 443; Gomez-Vigil v. INS, 990 F.2d 1111 (9th
Cir. 1993); Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1017; Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993); Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d
769 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1991).
20. See, e.g., Wojcik v. INS, 951 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1991);Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d
46 (3d Cir. 1991); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
112 S. Ct. 583 (1991); Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1990).
21. See, e.g., Castilo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1022-23 (describing BIA use of administra-
tive notice of results of Nicaraguan election); Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 591 (describing
BIA use of administrative notice of Polish election).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1101a (1988).
23. Compare Getachew v. INS, No. 92-70836, 1994 WL 234557 (9th Cir. June 2,
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tion to reopen BIA proceedings is a constitutionally acceptable
means of rebutting administratively noticed facts. 4 The U.S.
Supreme Court has twice denied certiorari on this question. 5
This Note addresses the conflict within the U.S. Courts of
Appeals regarding an alien's right to challenge the BIA's admin-
istrative notice of a political change in an asylum seeker's home
country. Part I of this Note discusses U.S. asylum law standards
and the procedures that an applicant must follow in seeking asy-
lum and in appealing an adverse asylum decision. Part I also
discusses the origin of administrative notice, its application in
immigration proceedings, and an alien's right to procedural due
process. Part II examines circuit court decisions addressing
whether an applicant is denied due process when the BIA takes
administrative notice of a change in the political situation in an
alien's home country without allowing the applicant an opportu-
nity to respond before a decision is rendered. Part III argues
that current immigration procedures are inadequate and that
the current BIA practice violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This Note concludes
that an alien should be warned before the BIA takes administra-
tive notice and permitted to challenge administratively noticed
1994) and de la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 1994) and Kahssai v.
INS, 16 F.3d 323 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) and Sarria-Sibaa v. INS, 990 F.2d 442
(9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) and Gomez-Vigil v. INS, 990 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam) and Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1993) and Castillo-Villagra v.
INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992) (all holding that BIA administrative notice of
change in government of applicant's native country without warning to and adequate
rebuttal from asylum applicant violates due process) with Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d
26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993) and Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS,
954 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1992) and Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1991) and
Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -_, 112 S. Ct. 583
(1991) (all holding that BIA administrative notice of change of government in appli-
cant's native country does not violate due process where applicant may challenge no-
ticed facts in motion to reopen). See Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1993)
(agreeing with Seventh Circuit in dicta). Other cases have ruled on the use of adminis-
trative notice by the BIA without discussing due process. See Baka v. INS, 963 F.2d 1376
(10th Cir. 1992); Wojcik v. INS, 951 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1991); Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d
702 (10th Cir. 1991);Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1991); Kubon v. INS, 913
F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1990); McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89 (3rd Cir. 1986).
24. See Llana-Castellon, 16 F.3d at 1100; Gomez-Vigil, 990 F.2d at 1114; "Castillo-Vil-
lagra, 972 F.2d at 1029; Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 34; Gutierrez-Rogue, 954 F.2d at 773;
Rivera-Cruz, 948 F.2d at 968; Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 596-97.
25. Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct.
1943 (1993); Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 583
(1991).
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facts before the BIA renders a decision.26
I. HISTORY OF ASYLUM, ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE, AND
.DUE PROCESS
The statutory requirements of U.S. asylum law have been
shaped largely by compliance with international treaties on the
treatment of refugees.17  The administrative procedures gov-
erning asylum decisions include provisions that allow an alien to
appeal an adverse decision to the BIA.2 8 Like other government
agencies, the BIA has used the doctrine of administrative notice
to resolve cases before it, particularly appeals from aliens seeking
asylum. 9 Administrative notice allows an agency to establish the
existence of facts without resorting to formal methods of
proof.3° Administrative notice of facts without allowing a party
to the proceeding an opportunity to respond may violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution.31
A. Asylum Law in the United States
U.S. immigration law allows aliens with a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group to
enter or remain in the United States rather than return to their
26. See Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1029. This Note addresses the due process im-
plications of administrative notice during an appeal to the BIA, not administrative no-
tice by the judges who initially decide asylum applications.. If an asylum request has
been denied on the basis of administratively noticed facts before an appeal to the BIA,
the alien has an opportunity to challenge these facts on appeal to the BIA. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.8 (1993). Because these aliens have an opportunity to rebut these facts, there is
no deprivation of due process. See Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 1993)
(no due process violation where Polish aliens were asked before appeal to BIA to ad-
dress Solidarity's participation in coalition government).
27. See 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,July 28, 1951, art. 1, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 (establishing international
standards for treatment of refugees).
28. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1993).
29. See, e.g., Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 707 (10th Cir. 1991) (BIA notice change
in Polish government); Wojcik v. INS, 951 F.2d 172, 173 (8th Cir. 1991) (same).
30. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 34.01.
31. See Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 300 (1937)
(holding state agency denied due process by computing property value on basis of facts
officially noticed but not disclosed in record).
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home countries.3  Both aliens detained at U.S. borders and
those already present in the United States are eligible for asy-
lum. 3 These aliens may apply for asylum directly to the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, 4 or they may assert an asy-
lum claim during deportation or exclusion proceedings.3 5 A de-
cision rendered during deportation or exclusion proceedings
may be appealed to the BIA.3 6 After a decision by the BIA, aliens
may file a motion to reopen the case if new evidence arises. 7
Finally, the BIA's decision in a deportation case may be appealed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals." Final decisions rendered in an
exclusion proceeding may be reviewed in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding in U.S. District Court.39
1. An Overview of U.S. Asylum Law
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(the "Convention") includes a definition of "refugee" that was
adopted by the United States in the Immigration and Nationality
Act (the "INA") .4  Although the United States was not a signa-
tory to the Convention, it acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (1988). The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the
Immigration and Nationality Act (the "INA") and established a new statutory procedure
for granting asylum to refugees. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102
(1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1988)).
33. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 151.
34. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a) (1993).
35. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1993). Exclusion occurs when aliens seeking entry to the
United States from outside U.S. borders are rejected. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1988) (exclu-
sion procedure); 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988) (defining excludable aliens); see also BOSWELL,
supra note 12, at 67. Deportation refers to proceedings initiated against aliens who
have already entered the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1988) (deportation proce-
dure); 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988) (defining deportable aliens); BOSWELLL supra note 12, at
69. The difference between exclusion and deportation hinges on whether an alien has
"entered" the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(13) (1988) ("entry" defined); see also
BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 69. Aliens charged with deportation, unlike those charged
with exclusion, are entitled to the protection of the U.S. Constitution, including the
right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 26
(1982).
36. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1993).
37. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1993).
38. 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1988).
39. Id.
40. See 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of RefugeesJuly 28, 1951, art. 1, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152. A "refugee" was defined as any person
outside his or her country of nationality and unwilling or unable to return to it "owing
to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Id. This definition of
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to the Status of Refugees, which incorporated the Convention
definition of a "refugee" by reference.41 The INA gives the U.S.
Attorney General discretion to allow aliens to remain in the
United States if they have suffered persecution in the past or
they have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group.42 Asylum is thus a discretionary rem-
edy.43 An alien who satisfies the statutory definition of a refugee
may be denied asylum in the exercise of discretion." For exam-
ple, aliens have been denied asylum in the exercise of discretion
because they entered the United States with fraudulent docu-
ments.
45
As the statutory definition of a refugee indicates, aliens
must establish either that they have suffered persecution in the
"refugee" is identical in all but phrasing to the one adopted in the Immigration and
Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1988) (defining refugee).
41. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 268, 268 n.1. The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
incorporates the definition of refugee from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees. See 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art.
1, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 151. This definition of refugee is identical in
all but phrasing to the one adopted in the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (1988).
42. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (a) (42) (A), 1158 (1988). The U.S. Attorney General is also
responsible for the administration and enforcement of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103.
For practical reasons, the Attorney General delegates the administration of the INA to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). See8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (18) (1988).
The INS is a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Justice. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (34) (1988).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). An alien "may be granted asylum" in the discretion
of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that the alien satisfies the
statutory definition of a refugee. Id.; see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.5
(1987). Asylum is one of two methods through which otherwise deportable aliens who
claim that they will be persecuted if deported can seek relief. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
at 423. Section 243(h) of the INA requires the Attorney General to withhold deporta-
tion of aliens who demonstrate that their "life or freedom would be threatened" on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or polit-
ical opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988). In INS v. Stevic, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that in order to qualify for withholding of deportation, aliens must demonstrate that "it
is more likely than not that [they] would be subject to persecution" in the country to
which they would be returned. 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).
44. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (aliens may be granted asylum "in discretion" of
the U.S. Attorney General).
45. See Walai v. INS, 552 F. Supp. 998, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Afghan national with
fraudulent passport denied asylum despite well-founded fear of persecution); Matter of
Shirdel, Interim Decision No. 2958 (BIA Feb. 21, 1984) (same); Matter of Salim, 18 I. &
N. Dec. 311 (1982) (same).
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past 46 or that they have a well-founded fear of persecution in
their countries of origin.47 The U.S. Supreme Court established
a standard for determining whether an alien has a well-founded
fear of persecution in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.48 In Cardoza-Fon-
seca, a Nicaraguan entered the United States as a visitor and re-
mained longer than permitted. 49 The INS commenced deporta-
tion proceedings, and the Nicaraguan requested asylum in the
United States.5 ' An Immigration Judge ("IJ") and the BIA ruled
that the Nicaraguan was not eligible for asylum because she had
not established a "clear probability of persecution" if she was re-
turned to Nicaragua.5" The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held
that the "well-founded fear" standard that governs asylum pro-
ceedings is different and more generous than the "clear
probability" standard used by the IJ and the BIA.52 In Cardoza-
Fonseca, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the reference to
"fear" in the statutory definition of a refugee makes the determi-
nation of an alien's eligibility turn to some extent on the subjec-
tive mental state of the alien.5" In addition, the Court observed
that an alien could have a well-founded fear of persecution even
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (aliens eligible for asylum "because of persecu-
tion or a well-founded fear of persecution"); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir.
1988) ("[Plast persecution, without more, satisfies the [definition of a refugee] even
independent of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution."); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b)
(1993) ("The applicant may qualify as a refugee either because he has suffered actual
past persecution or because he has a well-founded fear of future persecution."). Once
an applicant has shown past persecution, the burden of proof shifts to the government
to show that the alien lacks a well-founded fear of future persecution. In re Chen,
Interim Dec. 3104, at 6-7 (BIAApr. 25, 1989); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (proof of past perse-
cution creates presumption of well-founded fear of persecution).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42(A).
48. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). The U.S. Supreme Court held that the "well-founded
fear" standard of proof for asylum is not equivalent to the "more likely than not" stan-
dard applicable to withholding of deportation. Id.; see supra note 42 (describing with-
holding of deportation). The Court noted that Congress used different, broader lan-
guage to define the term "refugee" in section 208(a) of the INA than it used to describe
the aliens entitled to withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the INA. Id.
at 432. This difference in language, the Court found, reflected U.S. compliance with
the provisions of the 1967 Protocol, which does not require aliens to show that it is
more likely than not that they will be persecuted. Id. at 436-41. Lastly, the Court found
that the legislative history of the INA demonstrates the congressional intent that differ-
ent standards apply to asylum and withholding of deportation. Id. at 441-43.
49. Id. at 424.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 425.
52. Id. at 449-50.
53. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987); see Matter of Acosta, Interim
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when there is less than a fifty percent chance of the persecution
occurring. 54
Since Cardoza-Fonseca, U.S. courts and the BIA agree that an
applicant for asylum has established that his fear is "well-
founded" if he shows that a reasonable person in his circum-
stances would fear persecution.55 As the Supreme Court indi-
cated, a reasonable person may well fear persecution even where
its likelihood is significantly less than clearly probable. 6 How-
ever, there must be a reasonable possibility of actually suffering
such persecution.5 7 The applicant must show that his fear of
persecution is both subjectively genuine and objectively reason-
able." The objective component requires a showing by credible,
direct, and specific evidence in the record of facts that would
support a reasonable fear that the applicant faces persecution.59
2. U.S. Asylum Application Procedures
An alien may initiate a request for asylum in the United
States in two ways.6" An alien may apply for asylum directly to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS").61 Alter-
natively, an alien may seek asylum during exclusion or deporta-
tion proceedings6 2 before an IJ.63 Aliens may not appeal an INS
Dec. No. 2986, at 14 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985) (noting subjective element of well-founded fear
standard).
54. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431. As an example, the Court noted hypotheti-
cally that in a country where every tenth adult male was either killed or sent to a remote
labor camp, an alien who managed to escape from this country would have a well-
founded fear of persecution. Id. (quoting 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 180 (1966)).
55. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1987); Sanchez-Trujillo v.
INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
59. Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). In view of this standard of
proof, there must be a showing that: (1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a
persecutor seeks to overcome in other by means of some sort of punishment; (2) the
persecutor is aware or could become aware that the alien possesses this belief or charac-
teristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the perse-
cutor has the inclination to punish the alien. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439
(BIA 1987).
60. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (1993).
61. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a).
62. See supra note 35 (explaining deportation and exclusion).
63. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b).
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decision denying asylum, 64 but they are entitled to renew their
requests during exclusion and deportation proceedings.65
Aliens who are within the United States are subject to deporta-
tion.66 These aliens, unlike aliens at U.S. borders, are entitled to
a full hearing on their asylum requests.67
a. Requests for Asylum Filed Directly with the INS
Persons not charged with exclusion or deportation may ap-
ply for asylum status at an INS office with jurisdiction over the
alien's place of residence in the United States or the port of en-
try where the alien has landed.68 These applications are referred
to Asylum Officers ("AOs") 6 9 who decide whether to grant appli-
cations for asylum.70 As part of their review of an asylum applica-
tion, AOs schedule an interview with the asylum applicant and
gather information about human rights conditions in the appli-
cant's country of origin. The AOs forward the applications to
the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs (the "BHRHA") for information on human
rights conditions in the applicants' home countries. 71  The
BHRHA may assess the accuracy of aliens' statements about con-
ditions in their home countries and it may evaluate whether the
aliens will be persecuted upon their return to their home coun-
try.72 In addition, the BHRHA advisory opinion may include in-
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 35 (explaining deportation and exclusion).
67. Id.
68. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a).
69. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2. These asylum officers are specially trained in international
relations and international law. 8 C.F.R. § 208.1 (b) (1993). There are approximately
150 asylum officers in the United States. Tim Weiner, U.S. Plans to Delay Work Permits for
Immigrants Who Seek Asylum, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1994, at Al. The Office of Refugees,
Asylum and Parole and the Asylum Policy and Review Unit of the U.S. Department of
Justice, in coordination with the U.S. Department of State, must compile and dissemi-
nate to asylum officers information concerning persecution in other countries and
must maintain a documentation center with information on human rights conditions.
8 C.F.R. § 208.1(c).
70. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a). Asylum officers decide whether to grant requests for asy-
lum and withholding of deportation. Id. Withholding of deportation is available to an
alien whose life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See INS v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407 (1984).
71. 8 C.F.R. § 208.11(a).
72. Id. At one time, BHRHA commented on all asylum applications; but in recent
years it has commented only on selected applications. Id.
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formation about similarly situated aliens from that country.73
The AO uses this information from the BHRHA to determine
whether the alien has a well-founded fear of persecution in his
home country and to evaluate the alien's credibility.74
The AO also arranges an interview with the applicant.75
The interview is intended as a non-adversarial proceeding and if
the applicant so requests, it will be conducted in private. 76 The
purpose of the interview is to elicit all information relevant to
the applicant's eligibility for asylum.77 The AO is authorized to
present and receive evidence and question the applicant and any
witnesses. 78 The applicant can have counsel present at the inter-
view and he may introduce evidence. 79 Aliens have the burden
of proving that they are refugees as defined by statute. 80
Thereafter, the AO issues a written decision."1 An AO may
grant or deny an application in the exercise of discretion to an
applicant who qualifies as a refugee, unless a grant is prohibited
by a mandatory ground for denial."2 Mandatory grounds for de-
nial include conviction of a serious crime in the United States,8 3
firm resettlement in a third country after the flight from perse-
cution, 4 national security concerns,8 5 and participation by the
alien in the persecution of others.8 6 If the AO decides to deny
asylum, the decision must state why the request was denied and
must include an assessment of the alien's credibility8 7 An alien
denied asylum by an AO may be subject to immediate deporta-
tion or exclusion."' A request for asylum may be renewed, how-
73. Id.
74. 2 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 34.02 (rev. ed. 1993); see supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text (discussing well-
founded fear of persecution).
75. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (1993). Unlike an immigration hearing before an Immigra-
tion Judge, the interview with an AO is considered non-adversarial. Id.
76. 2 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 74, § 34.02[6][a].
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (1993).
81. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17.
82. 2 GORDON & MAILMN, supra note 74, § 34.02[10][b].
83. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1).
84. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2).
85. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c) (3).
86. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c).
87. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17.
88. 2 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 74, § 34.02[11][a].
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ever, at a subsequent exclusion or deportation proceeding
before an IJ.89
b. Requests for Asylum Made During Exclusion and
Deportation Hearings
A request for asylum may be asserted during exclusion or
deportation proceedings before an IJ.9° Exclusion occurs when
aliens seeking entry to the United States are rejected at the bor-
der or a port of entry because they do not have a required visa or
because they have not complied with the U.S. immigration
laws.91 Deportation refers to the expulsion of aliens, who are
already physically within the borders of the United States, for
non-compliance with U.S. immigration laws.92 Grounds for ex-
clusion93 are quite broad94 and include: prior criminal convic-
tions;95 health-related reasons;96 security-related concerns;9 7 in-
89. 8 C.F.R. 208.18(b). On March 30, 1994, the INS proposed new rules for the
handling of asylum claims that, if enacted, would substantially change the role of the
Asylum Officer (the "AO") during asylum process. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,779 (1994) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 208, 236, 242 and 274a) (proposed Mar. 30, 1994).
Under the proposed rules, AOs would no longer prepare detailed denials of asylum
claims. Id. Instead, they would automatically issue mandatory referrals of applications
not granted asylum to Ijs. Id. Interviews would be discretionary and AOs would be
authorized to refer claims immediately to an IJ. Id.
90. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b).
91. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 67.
92. Id. The primary difference between deportation and exclusion is the level of
procedural due process in the two proceedings. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-26
(1982).
93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988).
94. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 25.
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1992). The criminal exclusion cate-
gory includes persons who have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(1), those convicted of more than one crime, regardless of
whether it involved moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (B), and persons who have
been involved in the trafficking of narcotics, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (C).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1). Health-related grounds include any alien found to have
a communicable disease of public health significance, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1) (A) (i), or a
physical or mental disorder that may pose a threat to the property, safety or welfare of
the alien or others, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1988), or who is found to be a drug
abuser or addict, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A) (iii).
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3). Security-related grounds for exclusion include a rea-
sonable belief that an alien will engage in espionage or sabotage, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(A), or terrorist activities, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). In addition, an alien
is excludable if the U.S. Secretary of State believes that an alien's entry or proposed
activities would have "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences" for the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(C). In general, any immigrant who is or has been
a member of the Communist Party is excludable, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (D), but gener-
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ability to financially support oneself;98 lack of proper labor certi-
fication and work qualifications;99 prior illegal entry;100 lack of
proper documentation; 10 1 or ineligibility for citizenship.1 2
Grounds for the deportation of aliens already within the U.S.
include: excludability at entry; 3 inability to financially support
oneself;' 04 criminal offenses;1 5 failure to register or falsification
of documents;' 06 and security-related grounds.'07 Once deporta-
tion or exclusion proceedings have begun, only an IJ can enter-
tain a request for asylum.10 8 Even those requests filed previously
ous waivers are available. See id. Any alien who participated in Nazi persecution or
genocide is excludable. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (E).
98. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (aliens may be excluded if likely to become public
charge).
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5). In general, any alien who seeks to enter the United
States in order to perform skilled or unskilled labor is excludable, unless the U.S. Secre-
tary of Labor has previously approved the application. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (5) (A). Aliens
seeking to practice medicine in the United States, but who have not graduated from an
accredited medical school, will be excluded unless they pass an examination and are
competent in English. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (5) (B).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6). In general, aliens deported within the previous one
year are excludable. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (6) (A). In addition, stowaways, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(D), smugglers, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E), and aliens who seek entry by
fraud or wilful misrepresentation are excludable. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (6) (C).
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(8). In addition to these eight categories of excludable
aliens, practicing polygamists, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9) (A), and aliens withholding custody
of a child in violation of a U.S. court order, are excludable. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9) (c).
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(i) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). If an alien has been admitted
to the United States but should have been excluded at entry, this is a separate basis for
deportation. Id.; BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 69.
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (5). Any alien who, within five years after the date of entry,
has become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since
entry, is deportable. Id.
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). Any alien convicted of a crime of moral turpitude
within five years after the date of entry and confined for longer than one year, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(i), convicted of more than one crime involving moral turpitude re-
gardless of whether the alien was confined, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2) (A) (ii), or convicted
of an aggravated felony at any time after entry, is deportable. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (a) (2) (A) (iii). Any alien convicted of a controlled substance violation, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (2)(B), and certain firearms offenses is deportable. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (2) (C).
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (3).
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4). Aliens engaged in espionage or sabotage, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (4) (A), terrorist activities, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (4) (B), or who have participated
in Nazi persecution or genocide are deportable, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (4) (D). In addition,
an alien whose presence or activities the U.S. Secretary of State believes would have
.potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences" for the United States is de-
portable. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (C).
108. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1993). In 1983, the IJs and the BIA were reorganized
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with an asylum officer must be refiled with an IJ if an alien has
been placed in exclusion or deportation proceedings. 0 9
The IJ will gather information about human rights condi-
tions in the applicant's country of origin and will schedule a
hearing to consider the request for asylum and any grounds for
exclusion or deportation. 10 Like the AO, the IJ will refer an
asylum application to the BHRHA for information about human
rights conditions in the alien's country of origin.' In contrast
to the interview with an AO, however, the hearing before the IJ
in either exclusion or deportation proceedings is a due process
hearing.1 12 The applicant is entitled present witnesses and docu-
mentary evidence, cross-examine opposing witnesses, and dis-
pute derogatory evidence."1 3 The government is represented by
an INS attorney in proceedings before an IJ.1 14 An alien is nor-
under the Executive Office of Immigration Review, a division of the U.S. Department of
Justice separate from the INS. 6 GrIrTEL GORDON & CHARLES GORDON, IMMIGRATION LAw
AND PROCEDURE § 150.0311) (rev. ed. 1993).
A request for asylum initiated during deportation or exclusion proceedings is also
treated automatically as a request for withholding of deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b)
(1993). Withholding of deportation is a mandatory form of relief from deportation
available to aliens who can demonstrate probability of persecution on account of their
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). Withholding of deportation differs from asylum in three important
ways. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A
GUIDE TO LAw AND PRACTICE 6-33 (1992). First, asylum is a discretionary remedy, and
withholding is mandatory. Id. Second, withholding is available only to those aliens
whose life or freedom will likely be threatened on return to their native country. Id.
Although an alien whose life or freedom has been threatened is eligible for asylum, not
every alien who is eligible for asylum is necessarily eligible for withholding of deporta-
tion. Id. Lastly, withholding of deportation applies only to the country in which the
alien's life or freedom is threatened, not to any other country that will accept him. Id.
If withholding of deportation is granted, the deportation order against the alien can
still be executed if another country will admit the alien. Id. In order to qualify for
withholding, an alien must demonstrate a "clear probability" that they will be perse-
cuted in the country as to which withholding is sought. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407
(1984).
109. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b).
110. 2 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 74, § 34.02[11][a].
111. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(b) (1993) (referral of asylum applications to BHRHA from
exclusion proceedings); 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (3) (1993) (referral of asylum applications
to BHRHA from deportation proceedings). The BHRHA has curtailed its responses to
requests for such information in recent years. 2 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 74,
§ 34.02[111][a];see supra note 72 (noting decline in BHRHA response to AO requests for
human rights information).
112. 2 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 74, § 34.02[11][a].
113. Id.
114. 8 C.F.R. § 3.16 (1993).
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mally represented by an attorney, although the government is
not required to provide an attorney." 5
The IJ may grant or deny the asylum application.1"6 The IJ
makes a determination de novo on the asylum application, re-
gardless of whether a previous application was filed or decided
by an A. 1 7 In determining whether an alien has a well-founded
fear of persecution, the IJ has the authority to assess the credibil-
ity of witnesses." l " A finding that testimony of a witness was not
credible, however, must be supported by substantial evidence. x9
The decision of an IJ on an asylum application is appealable to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.1 20
3. Appeals and Motions Before the Board of Immigration
Appeals
Since 1922, the BIA has existed under various names and
has held various responsibilities.121 When immigration laws were
enforced by the Secretary of Labor, the panel was known as the
Board of Review.1 22 In 1940, when the responsibility for immi-
gration enforcement was transferred to the Attorney General,
the Board of Review was renamed the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals.1 23 Today, the BIA is a division of the U.S. Department of
Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review.'1 4 The Exec-
utive Office for Immigration Review includes a separate entity
for IJs.125 The BIA is a quasi-judicial panel of five administrative
judges that does not operate like a court in a traditional judicial
sense.1 26 The BIA's decisions are binding on the INS127 and
115. Id.
116. 2 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 74, § 34.02[11][e].
117. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1993).
118. 2 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 74, § 34.02[11][c].
119. Id.
120. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1993).
121. 6 GoRDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.03[1].
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also 5 Fed. Reg. 3,503 (1940) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-
3.8 (1993)).
124. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1). The Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR")
was established in 1983, at which time the BIA and the IJs were placed in the newly
created office. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.03[1]. Formerly, the BIA
was attached to the office of the Attorney General, subject to the general supervision of
the Deputy Attorney General. Id.
125. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1).
126. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.0312].
127. 6 id. § 150.02[1].
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published BIA decisions serve as precedent 2
a. Appeals to the BIA
The BIA has appellate jurisdiction over a number of IJ deci-
sions, including those made in the course of exclusion and de-
portation proceedings.1 29 Generally, only the party aggrieved by
the IJ's decision may appeal.'10  In exclusion and deportation
proceedings, the person ordered excluded or deported is obvi-
ously an aggrieved party and is eligible to appeal.13 1 The INS,
which is a party to all proceedings before District Directors and
IJs, has standing to appeal to the BIA from a decision that it
opposed below.' 3 2 Local INS attorneys brief the INS' position
on each appeal to the BIA and serve as opposing counsel when
an alien appeals to the BIA.133
In order to appeal to the BIA, an alien must file a notice of
appeal with the INS office or the office of the I with jurisdiction
over the case.134 The notice of appeal must be filed within the
time required by immigration regulations.13 5 In deportation
cases, the notice of appeal must be filed within ten calendar days
after the mailing of a written decision or the stating of an oral
decision. 13 6 In exclusion cases, where the IJ's decision is oral,
excluded aliens must state immediately after the decision is
128. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(h) (1993).
129. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (b). The appellate jurisdiction of the BIA includes: decisions of
Us in exclusion, deportation, waiver of inadmissibility, recision of adjustment of status,
and temporary protected status cases; decisions of INS District Directors involving ad-
ministrative fines, family visa petitions, and waiver of inadmissibility cases; and determi-
nations relating to bond, parole, or detention of an alien in deportation proceedings.
Id. In addition, any decision that is appealable to the BIA may be certified to the BIA
for final decision by the Commissioner of the INS, an U, a District Director, or the BIA
itself. Matter of Santos, 19 I. & N. Dec. 105 (BIA 1984).
The BIA has original jurisdiction for the prescription of rules governing proceed-
ings before it, 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (d)(3), the recognition of organizations and accreditation
of individuals to practice before the INS, IJs, and the BIA, 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(d)(3), 1502.2
(1993), and the discipline of attorneys and representatives practicing before the INS,
IJs, and the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 292.3 (1993).
130. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.06[1].
131. Id.
132. Id.; Byus-Narvaez v. INS, 601 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 1979).
133. 6 GORDON & GoRDON, supra note 108, § 150.06[4][fl.
134. 8 C.F.R. § 3.3(a) (1993).
135. Id.
136. 8 C.F.R. § 3.38(b) (1993). If the decision was mailed to the alien, a notice of
appeal must be filed within 13 days. Id.
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made whether they wish to appeal.'3 7 If excluded aliens want to
appeal to the BIA, they must file the proper forms immedi-
ately.13 1 When a written decision is issued by the IJ in an exclu-
sion case, the alien has thirteen days in which to file an ap-
peal.139
The parties may submit briefs in support of their case. 40
Briefs must be submitted with the notice of appeal or within
such additional time as is allowed. 4 ' If oral argument before
the BIA is desired, a request should be made in the notice of
appeal'." 2 The BIA can reject an appeal for a number of rea-
sons, including the absence of any grounds for the appeal, the
lack of a legal or factual basis for appeal, or because the appeal is
filed for the purposes of delay.'1 3
The BIA reviews the decision of the IJ solely on the basis of
the administrative record.'44 The BIA does not receive the oral
testimony of witnesses 4 ' and will ordinarily neither receive nor
consider new evidence, unless it is presented in a motion to reo-
pen. 4 6 The scope of BIA review is broad and the BIA may make
its own fact findings on the evidence.'" The BIA, however, nor-
mally accepts the IJ's findings of fact if they are adequately sup-
ported. 48 The BIA does not rule on constitutional attacks on
the INA itself.'49 The BIA often decides, however, questions of
procedural due process and statutory construction. 50 In addi-
tion, the BIA may overrule discretionary determinations below if
137. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.06[3];BOsWELL, supra note 12, at
28.
138. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.06[3].
139. 8 C.F.R. § 236.7 (1993).
140. 8 C.F.R. § 3.3(c).
141. Id. On request, the BIA usually grants extensions of 10 days. 6 GORDON &
GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.06[4][d].
142. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (e). Previously, oral argument was generally allowed on request.
6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.07. It is now available only in the discre-
tion of the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e).
143. 8 C.F:R. §§ 3.1(d), 103.3 (1993).
144. Matter of Chavarri-Alva, 14 I. & N. Dec. 298 (BIA 1973).
145. Matter of Reyes, 16 1. & N. Dec. 475 (BIA 1978).
146. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.07[3] [a].
147. Noverola-Bolaino v. INS, 395 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1968); Canjura-Flores v. INS,
784 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1985).
148. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.07[3] [a].
149. 6 id. § 150.07[3][c];see Matter of Awadh, 15 I. & N. Dec. 775 (BIA 1976).
150. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.07[3][c].
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it disagrees with those determinations. 151 In most instances
where an alien's request for asylum or other relief has been de-
nied by an IJ, the execution of the IJ's order of deportation or
exclusion will be stayed automatically pending appeal to the
BIA.1 An appeal of an IJ's decision denying a motion to reo-
pen or to reconsider, however, will not stay the execution of the
order, unless the IJ or the BIA specifically grants a stay.' 53
The BIA commonly takes up to a year or more to render a
decision.'54 BIA rulings on an appeal of an IJ decision are always
in writing in the form of an opinion. 55 Individual members of
the BIA may file separate concurring or dissenting opinions. 56
The BIA may grant the relief requested or remand the case to
the INS or the IJ for further action.' 57 Due to the large number
of cases currently before it, the BIA frequently uses dismissal or-
ders with the same language as that used in earlier cases.' 58
b. Motions Before the BIA and Stays Pending Their
Determination
There are two motions that a party to a BIA proceeding may
use to highlight new developments in the facts or the law of a
particular case.' 59 When new evidence becomes available, a mo-
tion to reopen may be used to bring these new facts to the atten-
tion of the BIA.' 6° Where only legal developments have
emerged, a motion to reconsider is appropriate.' 6' The BIA has
the discretion to reopen or reconsider any case it has decided.' 62
If the BIA grants a motion to reopen, it ordinarily remands
151. 6 id. § 150.07[3] [a].
152. 8 C.F.R. § 3.6(a) (1993).
153. 8 C.F.R. § 3.6(b).
154. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 108, at 8-5.
155. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.07[5].
156. Id.
157. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(d).
158. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.07[5];see, e.g., Castillo-Villagra v.
INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 1992). In the case of Nicaraguan appeals pending
before the BIA, the Castillo-Villagra Court observed that "identical language was used in
a large number of other cases, apparently as INS form language for Nicaraguan cases
after Violeta Chamorro won the Nicaraguan presidential election." Id.
159. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.08[l[a].
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2.
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the case to the IJ for further proceedings.1 63 Because a motion
to reconsider raises only a question of law, there is usually no
need to remand the case to the IJ.164 If the BIA is persuaded by
a motion to reconsider that its prior decision was incorrect, it
enters a new decision.16 If the BIA is not persuaded, it denies
the motion to reconsider. 66 An alien may petition the U.S.
Court of Appeals to review the BIA's denial of the motion to
reopen or reconsider. 6 7 This appeal entitles the alien to an au-
tomatic stay of deportation or exclusion pending review by a
U.S. Court of Appeals.16
4. The Motion to Reopen BIA Proceedings
The BIA will reopen a case to allow the asylum applicant to
offer new evidence that is relevant to the movant's applica-
tion.169 The motion will only be granted, however, if the new
evidence is "material," was not previously available to the appli-
cant, and could not have been discovered or presented at the
earlier hearing. 70 Where a motion to reopen is filed for the
purpose of seeking some form of discretionary relief such as asy-
lum, the new evidence supporting the motion must establish
that the alien meets all of the statutory eligibility requirements1 7 1
and that the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted.1 72
Unlike an appeal to the BIA,17 1 filing a motion to reopen or
163. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.08[1] [a].
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1988).
169. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2. "Motions to reopen in deportation proceedings shall not be
granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material
and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former
hearing." Id. "Motion to reopen shall state the new facts to be proved at the reopened
hearing." 8 C.F.R. § 3.8 (1993).
170. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2.
171. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (describing statutory standards
for asylum).
172. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.08[1][d];see, e.g., Matter of Sipus,
14 I. & N. Dec. 229 (BIA 1979) (appeal dismissed for failure to establish extreme hard-
ship element of suspension of deportation); Matter of Reyes, 18 I. & N. Dec. 249 (BIA
1982) (appeal dismissed where suspension of deportation would likely be denied in
exercise of discretion).
173. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (describing stay of deportation
for appeals to BIA, but not motion to reopen).
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reconsider with the BIA does not automatically stay execution of
a deportation or exclusion order.1 74 For this reason, it is possi-
ble that an alien will be deported before the motion is de-
cided. 175 In a deportation case, if execution of the deportation
order is not imminent, an alien may apply for a stay of deporta-
tion with the motion to reopen. 176 If there is a possibility that
the INS may attempt to deport the alien while the motion before
the BIA remains undecided, a stay of deportation should be
sought locally from the District Director 177 and where appropri-
ate, the IJ.178 If these measures are unsuccessful, a telephonic
stay may be sought directly from the BIA. 179 If the BIA denies a
stay, judicial review of the denial is available in U.S. District
Court. 10
The burden of proof on an alien filing a motion to reopen
is substantial."" In INS v. Abudu,18 2 the U.S. Supreme Court up-
held the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen where the applicant
had not applied for asylum at her deportation hearing and did
not do so until three years later.18 3 The Court noted that there
were four bases for denying a motion to reopen. 8 4 First, the
applicant must establish a primafacie case for the underlying re-
lief sought.1 8 5 Second, the applicant must show that the evi-
dence that was not introduced earlier was at the time unavaila-
ble. ' 6 Third, the applicant must explain any failure to apply ini-
174. 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1993).
175. SeeCastillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017,1024 (9th Cir. 1992). "[A]sapracti-
cal matter, the remedy of a motion to reopen may be unavailable, because the peti-
tioner may be deported and the motion may become moot prior to decision." Id.; see
also Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 597 n.9 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.
Ct. 1943 (1993). "There thus exists the possibility that unsuccessful asylum applicants
may be ordered to leave the country before the Board has ruled on their motions to
reopen." Id.; see also Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d 142, 145 n.5 (7th Cir. 1993)
(INS declined to assure appellate court that petitioner would not be deported before
consideration of his good faith motion to reopen).
176. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.08[4][b].
177. 8 C.F.R. § 243.4 (1993).
178. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.6(b), 242.22 (1993).
179. 6 GORDON & GORDON, supra note 108, § 150.08[4][b].
180. Id.
181. United States v. Doherty, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992).
182. 485 U.S. 94 (1988).
183. Id.
184. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 96.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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tially for the relief requested where the reason for reopening is a
benefit not previously requested.187 Fourth, where the benefit
sought is discretionary, as is the case with asylum, applicants
must demonstrate that they are deserving of a favorable exercise
of discretion.188 The Court noted that the party moving to reo-
pen BIA proceedings bears a heavy burden, because of the
strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close and
preventing unnecessary delay of alien deportation.18 9 The U.S.
Supreme Court has strictly construed the requirements of a mo-
tion to reopen, describing it as "disfavored."1 90
5. Aliens Placed in Deportation Are Entitled to Procedural
Due Process
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that
no "person" shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. 9 ' The U.S. Supreme Court has long held,
however, that aliens who have not entered 92 the United States
are not "persons" entitled to the protection of the U:S. Constitu-
tion. 93 These aliens are subject to exclusion from the United
States, according to the Supreme Court, and Congress can estab-
lish whatever procedures it deems fit in determining excludabil-
187. Id.
188. Id. The appellate court, in Abudu, in deciding whether a primafacie case had
been presented, would have required the BIA to accept the facts as presented in the
new application as true and then decide whether the case should be reopened. Abudu
v. INS, 802 F.2d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1986), revd, 485 U.S. 94 (1988). The Supreme
Court rejected the appellate court's analogy to a motion for summary judgment and
instead compared the motion to reopen to a motion for a new trial in criminal law. INS
v. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110. "The appropriate analogy is a motion for a new trial in a
criminal case on the basis of newly discovered evidence, as to which the courts have
uniformly held that the moving party bears a heavy burden." Id.
189. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 n.5 (1981).
190. INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 724 (1992). "Motions for reopening of immi-
gration proceedings are disfavored for the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing,
and motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. This is especially
true in a deportation proceeding." Id. (quotinq INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107-08
(1988)).
191. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
192. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). An alien
"enters" the United States and becomes entitled to constitutional protection when the
alien crosses U.S. borders and remains in the United States outside the custody of immi-
gration authorities. Id.
193. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 108, at 8-5; Symposium, Due Process and the
Treatment of Aliens, 44 U. PiTr. L. REv. 165-328 (1983); Comment, Developments in the
Law: Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1286-1465 (1983).
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ity.194 Aliens who have entered the United States, on the other
hand, are "persons" within the meaning of many constitutional
protections, including due process. 195 As such, Congress cannot
establish procedures for determining deportability that are in-
consistent with the U.S. Constitution.1 96 Therefore, aliens al-
ready within the United States are entitled to a deportation hear-
ing that conforms to the minimum requirements of due pro-
cess.
197
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens within the United States to the same procedural safe-
guards due U.S. citizens in civil, criminal, and administrative
proceedings. 98 Although the U.S. Courts of Appeals are divided
on the BIA's use of administrative notice to deny asylum applica-
tions, the circuit courts that have reviewed this question have
unanimously concluded that an alien in a deportation proceed-
ing has a due process right to contest facts that have been ad-
ministratively noticed.1 99 According to these courts, deportation
proceedings must conform to the requirements of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and therefore include a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.2"'
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a
person has the right to be present before the tribunal that pro-
nounces judgment upon a question of life, liberty, or prop-
erty.2"1 The fundamental requirement of due process includes
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time'and in a mean-
194. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). Once Con-
gress establishes the procedure for exclusion, they must be maintained and the failure
to follow mandated procedures is a violation of due process. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3
(1915).
195. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903).
196. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
107. Id.
198. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950); Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Hellenic
Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970), rehg denied, 400 U.S. 856 (1971).
199. Gomez-Vigil v. INS, 990 F.2d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1993); Castillo-Villagra v.
INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 1992); Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26, 33 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 583 (1991); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 596 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993); Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 968 (5th Cir.
1991); Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d 769, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
200. Gomez-Vigil, 990 F.2d at 1114; Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1029; Rhoa-Zamora,
971 F.2d at 33; Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 596; Rivera-Cruz, 948 F.2d at 968; Gutierrez-Rogue,
954 F.2d at 773.
201. U.S. CONsT. amend. V, cl. 4.
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ingful manner °.2 2 In addition, an alien is entitled to a deporta-
tion decision based on the record created during and before the
hearing.2°3 Finally, due process entitles aliens to an individual-
ized determination of their interests20 4 and also requires that the
adjudicator consider the evidence and arguments that an alien
presents.20 5
6. Judicial Review of BIA Decisions
Aliens may petition a court to review orders rendered in
either deportation or exclusion proceedings. The procedure for
obtaining this review differs for each, however.20 6 An alien who
has been denied asylum in a deportation proceeding and is sub-
ject to a final deportation order may obtain judicial review of the
order by filing a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals in the judicial circuit where the IJ proceedings were con-
ducted or where the alien resides.207 Aliens denied asylum and
found to be excludable may not appeal an adverse decision di-
rectly to a higher court. Rather, aliens found to be excludable
can file a petition in a U.S. District Court for a writ of habeas
corpus in order to have the denial of asylum reviewed. 2°8 A writ
of habeas corpus is a mechanism for bringing prisoners or de-
tainees before a court in order to test the legality of their deten-
tion or imprisonment.20 9 An appeal to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals, in a deportation case, results automatically in a stay of the
deportation order, and the alien will not be removed from the
United States during the pendency of the appeal. A petition for
202. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
203. Id.
204. See Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 34.
205. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).
206. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1988). This Note is limited to an analysis of the use of
administrative notice in deportation cases. See supra note 13 (limiting Note to deporta-
tion cases). But see Dhine v. District Director, 818 F. Supp. 671, 677 (S.D.N.Y.) (BIA
erred in exclusion case by taking administrative notice of disputable fact that there had
been no persecution of Jews in Ethiopia after fall of Mengistu regime), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 3 F.3d 613 (2d Cir. 1993).
207. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). If the U.S. Court of Appeals denies the appeal, a deport-
able alien can also seek a writ of habeas corpus. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10).
208. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b).
209. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is not to determine the guilt or innocence of a prisoner or an alien's eligibility
for relief from deportation, but only whether the prisoner is deprived of his due pro-
cess. Id. The writ of habeas corpus is authorized by the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et. seq. (authorizing habeas corpus relief).
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a writ of habeas corpus in an exclusion case will not automati-
cally stay the execution of an exclusion order.
In both deportation and exclusion cases, an alien may only
seek review of a "final" order of deportation and exclusion. 1'
This finality requirement is satisfied if an alien appealing a de-
portation or exclusion order has exhausted all available adminis-
trative remedies, including an appeal to the BIA.211 In addition,
aliens may not obtain review of a final order of deportation or
exclusion if they have left the United States. 2
Reviewing courts use two different standards of review to
evaluate the factual findings and the exercise of discretion in an
asylum appeal.213 The factual findings of the IJ or the BIA on an
alien's eligibility for asylum must be upheld by a reviewing court
if supported by substantial evidence.21 4 If an alien meets the stat-
utory definition of a refugee, but the application is denied in the
discretion of the INS,21 this decision is reviewable for abuse of
discretion.
B. An Overview of the Doctrine of Administrative Notice
Administrative notice allows a fact finder to establish the
existence of facts without a formal introduction of proof to sup-
port those facts. 216 Administrative agencies may take administra-
tive notice of facts that are either common knowledge or that are
within the agency's area of expertise.217 An agency takes notice
of both adjudicative facts, which are specific to the parties and
their circumstances, and facts not concerning the parties, which
are called legislative facts. 218 Due process mandates that parties
to an agency proceeding be informed that the agency has taken
official notice and be given an opportunity to present evidence
210. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)-(b). A "final order" is not defined in the INA, but a final
order of deportation has been interpreted as including all determinations and orders
incidental to a deportation hearing by an U and reviewable by the BIA. BOSWELL, supra
note 12, at 218.
211. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c).
212. Id.
213. Saleh v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 238 (2d Cir. 1992).
214. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4).
215. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (explaining discretionary nature
of asylum).
216. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.01 at 2; 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 18,
§ 10.6, at 150.
217. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.01, at 3-4.
218. 4 id. § 25.02.
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in rebuttal. 19 Administrative notice in immigration proceedings
is not governed by any statute or regulation.2 ' Nonetheless, the
BIA has used this mechanism to recognize changes in an asylum
applicant's home country.2 1
1. The Scope of Administrative Notice
An agency can make a finding of fact without evidentiary
support by taking administrative notice of that fact.222 Like its
counterpart, judicial notice, administrative notice derives from
the practical observation that facts which are commonly known
need not be proved. 22 '3 By eliminating the necessity of proving
commonly acknowledged facts, judicial and administrative no-
tice make trials and administrative proceedings more efficient
and meaningful.224
The doctrine of administrative notice, however, is broader
than judicial notice. 225 Administrative notice allows an agency to
take notice of facts that are not commonly known, but are within
the agency's area of expertise. 26 This broad application of ad-
ministrative notice reflects the special expertise of administrative
officials who decide these cases. 227 Because administrative agen-
cies are designed to provide decision-making by persons who are
knowledgeable in the field, administrative notice may be taken
219. 4 id. § 25.03.
220. Gebremichael v.INS, 10 F.3d 28, 38 (1st Cir. 1993).
221. See, e.g., Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 1992);
Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -., 113 S. Ct. 1943
(1993) (describing BIA use of administrative notice); In re Chen, Interim Dec. 3104, at
7 (BIA Apr. 25, 1989) (observing that administrative notice may be used to rebut pre-
sumption created when alien proves past persecution).
222. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.01 at 2; 2 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 18,
§ 10.6, at 150.
223. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.01, at 2; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 14, § 359, at 1028; 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.6 (1994). "The
theory [ofjudicial notice] is that, where a fact is well-known by all reasonably intelligent
people in the community, or its existence is so easily determinable with certainty from
unimpeachable sources, it would not be good sense to require formal proof." Harper v.
Killion, 345 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
224. Walter Gellhorn, Official Notice in Administrative Adjudication, 20 TEx. L. REv.
131, 136 (1941). A case before an administrative agency, unlike one in court, "is rarely
an isolated phenomenon, but is rather merely one unit in a mass of related cases...
[that] often involve fact questions [that] have frequently been explored by the same
tribunal." Id.
225. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.01, at 3-4.
226. 4 id. § 25.01, at 3-4.
227. 4 id. § 25.01, at 4-5.
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of facts which are within an agency's area of expertise.228
2. Adjudicative and Legislative Facts
Courts and administrative agencies distinguish between two
different types of facts that may be judicially or administratively
noticed. 229 These categories are called adjudicative and legisla-
tive facts. 2 0 Adjudicative facts are those facts that relate to the
particular parties in an action and to their particular contro-
versy.231 Legislative facts are more general and do not concern
the immediate parties to an action. 2
The procedural safeguards that surround administrative no-
tice of legislative and adjudicative facts differ.23 3 Due to the im-
portance of adjudicative facts to the parties to an administrative
228. 4 id.; 2 DAVis & PIERCE, supra note 18, § 10.6, at 158.
229. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.02.
230. Id. This terminology was first developed by Professor Kenneth C. Davis. Ken-
neth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HAgv. L.
REV. 364, 404-07 (1942). This distinction between the types of facts that can be noticed
was adopted by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 201
advisory committee's note, Subdivision (a). Drawing the distinction between legislative
and adjudicative facts, however, can be a difficult task. 2 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 18,
§ 10.5, at 144. Even the commentators disagree on where to draw the line. See MCCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 18, § 328, at 920 (noting that question over whether date
of contract execution on June 3, 1906, was a Sunday is adjudicative fact); 2 DAVis &
PIERCE, supra note 18, § 10.6, at 155 (stating that same question is not adjudicative fact).
231. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.02, at 16. Adjudicative facts have been
succinctly defined as "simply the facts of the particular case." FED. R. EviD. 201 advisory
committee's note. "[T]hey helped explain who did what, when, where, how, and with
what motive and intent." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 18, § 328, at 920. Exam-
ples of an adjudicative fact include whether, in an automobile negligence case, a well-
known street was in fact within a local business district where a certain speed limit was
applicable. Varcoe v. Lee, 181 P. 223 (1919). At a time when Sunday contracts were
illegal, the question of whether the relevant sales contract, dated June 3, 1906, had
been executed on a Sunday is another example of an adjudicative fact. Beardsley v.
Irving, 81 Conn. 489 (1909).
232. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.02, at 16. Legislative facts have also been
defined as facts that "have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process,
whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge . . ' or in the
enactment of a legislative body." FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note, Subdivi-
sion (a). They are facts which the judge considers as part of his law-making function.
Id. Examples of legislative facts include any non-evidentiary fact that a judge considers
in determining whether a statute is constitutional, how a statute should be interpreted,
or how the common law should treat a particular issue. See, e.g., Javins v. First National
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir 1970) (judicial notice of facts concerning nature
of urban apartment rentals used to extend implied warranty of habitability to apart-
ment rentals).
233. 2 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 18, § 10.6, at 150.
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proceeding, it is generally easier for an administrative agency to
take notice of legislative facts than adjudicative facts.23 4 In addi-
tion, adjudicative facts vary in their certainty.235 Depending on
the degree to which adjudicative facts are disputable, some may
not be administratively noticed at all, while others may only be
noticed with prior warning to the parties or with an opportunity
for rebuttal.236
Both adjudicative and legislative facts may be administra-
tively noticed.237 For example, official notice that the Sandinista
Party has been defeated in Nicaraguan elections is a legislative
fact,238 which enables an agency to take official notice of this
development.239 However, administrative notice that the
Sandinistas no longer pose a threat to an asylum applicant is a
fact concerning one of the parties to an asylum hearing, and
therefore is properly called an adjudicative fact.2 40
4. Administrative Notice and Due Process
Due process may require that a party be permitted to re-
spond to administratively noticed facts in some manner.24 This
requirement may be satisfied in a variety of ways, depending on
234. Id.
235. See Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1028 (9th Cir. 1992).
236. Id. Several factors have been used to evaluate whether an administrative
agency has abused its discretion to take administrative notice. See Kenneth C. Davis,
Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 932 (1980). These factors include whether
the facts at issue are: (1) narrow and specific or broad and general; (2) central or
peripheral; (3) readily accepted or controversial; (4) purely factual or mixed with judg-
ment, policy or political preference; (5) readily provable or provable only with difficulty
or not at all; or, (6) facts about the parties or facts unrelated to them. Id.
237. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.02, at 17.
238. See, e.g., Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 37 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that
change of government is legislative fact); Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1027 (same).
239. Gebremichael, 10 F.3d at 31; CastioVillagra, 972 F.2d at 1027.
240. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1027.
241. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.03, at 24. A party to an administrative
proceeding may be entitled by statute to respond to administratively noticed facts. 4 id.
§ 25.03, at 25. The Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA") governs administrative
proceedings before some federal agencies. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988)). The APA does not distin-
guish between adjudicative and legislative facts. Id. § 7(d), 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1988). In-
stead, the APA provides that when an agency decision rests on official notice of a "mate-
rial" fact, a party is entitled to an opportunity to show the contrary. Id. The APA,
however, does not govern deportation and exclusion proceedings. See Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 309 (1955) (exclusivity provision of INA excludes application of
APA to immigration matters).
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the circumstances.242 For example, due process will be satisfied
if a party is allowed to submit contrary evidence and cross-ex-
amine the source of administratively noticed facts. 24 3 Depend-
ing on the interests at stake, the likelihood of administrative er-
ror, and the cost to the government,244 it may be sufficient to
allow the party to supplement the record or to move for a re-
hearing.245 Due process may also require that parties to an
agency proceeding be informed that official notice is being
taken by the agency and be given an opportunity to present evi-
dence in rebuttal.2 4 6 In determining whether a party to an ad-
ministrative proceeding has had a fair opportunity to respond, a
reviewing court will consider whether the administratively no-
ticed facts are adjudicative or legislative, the doubt or certainty
of the facts involved, and whether the fact is central or periph-
eral to the controversy.247
5. Administrative Notice by the BIA
U.S. immigration statutes and regulations make no refer-
ence to administrative notice, but the BIA has used this doctrine
to recognize certain facts in rendering decisions on immigration
and asylum appeals.248 In asylum cases, administrative notice has
been used by the BIA to recognize developments in an alien's
home country, particularly changes in the country's govern-
242. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.03, at 27.
243. 4 id. § 25.03, at 27-28.
244. Mathews v. Eldridge, 425 U.S. 319 (1976).
245. 2 DAVIs & PIERCE, supra note 18, § 10.6, at 162.
246. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.03, at 24. If there is other evidence in the
record to support the agency's decision, however, and none of the parties was
prejudiced by the lack of rebuttal, then the agency's decision will be affirmed. 4 id.
§ 25.03, at 25-27; see, e.g., Castillo v. INS, 951 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that BIA
will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support its findings).
247. See supra note 227 (listing criteria used to determine whether administrative
agency has abused discretion by taking administrative notice).
248. See, e.g., Matter of Giannoutsos, Interim Dec. 2742 (BIA 1979) (BIA may take
administrative notice of numerical limits on number of available visas); Matter of Chen,
Interim Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989) (BIA administrative notice of changes in Chinese society
since Cultural Revolution); Matter of Walsh & Pollard, Interim Dec. 3111 (BIA 1988)
(IJ administrative notice of INS handbook held proper). Regulations already provide
procedural protection for the taking of administrative notice by asylum officers. 8
C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (1993) ("Prior to the issuance of an adverse decision made in reli-
ance upon [state department materials], that material must be identified and the appli-
cant must be provided with an opportunity to inspect, explain, and rebut the material
• . ."). This regulation does not apply to IJ or the BIA. Id.
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ment.2 49 Furthermore, the BIA has administratively noticed
whether a particular group remains in power after an election
and whether the election has vitiated any prior well-founded fear
of persecution. 250  Although immigration statutes and regula-
tions do not expressly entitle asylum petitioners to rebut noticed
facts, all courts agree that an alien is entitled to respond to these
facts under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.251
However, these same courts disagree on whether a motion to
reopen BIA proceedings is a constitutionally sufficient method
of rebutting administrative notice of a change in the govern-
ment of an alien's home country.252
II. CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE BY THE BIA
U.S. circuit courts are divided on the question of whether
the BIA violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
249. See, e.g., Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 1992);
Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1943
(1993).
250. See, e.g., Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1022-23.
251. Getachew v. INS, No. 92-70836, 1994 U.S. App. WL 234557, at *3 (9th Cir.
June 2, 1994) ("due process requires the Board to refrain from taking administrative
notice of facts not in the record unless the procedures it follows are fair under the
circumstances"); de la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1994) (due
process requires meaningful opportunity to be heard, fact-finding based on 'disclosed
record, individualized determination of rights, and consideration of evidence and argu-
ment presented); Kahssai v. INS, 16 F.3d 323, 325 (9th Cir. 1994) (due process requires
that asylum applicant be allowed to rebut noticed facts); Gomez-Vigil v. INS, 990 F.2d
1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 1993) (BIA may not use its authority to take official notice so as to
deny meaningful hearing) (Aldisert,J., concurring); Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26,
33 (due process requires careful, individualized review of evidence presented and op-
portunity to rebut noticed facts), cert. denied, - U.S. -., 113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993); Castillo-
Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1030 (due process requires that asylum seeker be permitted to
rebut noticed facts); Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d 769, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (BIA
may not take notice so as to deny alien's due process right to meaningful hearing);
Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 968 (5th Cir. 1991) (interested parties must have
effective chance to respond to crucial facts); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 596 (7th
Cir.) (aliens have due process right to rebut officially noticed facts).
252. See Llana-Castellon, 16 F.3d at 1100 ("the reopening procedure does not sub-
stitute for advance notice and an opportunity to rebut administratively noticed facts
before the ruling is issued"); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 38 (1st Cir. 1993) (agree-
ing with those circuits that have held that motion to reopen satisfies due process)
(dicta); Gomez-Vigil, 990 F.2d at 1119 (holding that motion to reopen not adequate to
satisfy due process) (Aldisert, J., concurring); Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1030 (same);
Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d 769, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (motion to reopen proce-
dure provides adequate opportunity to challenge officially noticed facts); Rivera-Cruz,
948 F.2d at 968 (same); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 595-97 (same).
1994] NOTICE, DUE PROCESS, AND ASYLUM CLAIMS 985
of the U.S. Constitution when it takes administrative notice of a
change in a country's government and denies an alien's request
for asylum without providing an opportunity to respond.253 The
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit,
and the D.C. Circuit have held that the BIA does not violate an
alien's rights to procedural due process when it takes administra-
tive notice of a change in the government of the alien's native
country. 4 In contrast, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held
that by first taking administrative notice, and then failing to af-
ford aliens an opportunity to respond to these facts, the BIA vio-
lates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 55 The
U.S. Supreme Court has twice denied certiorari on this ques-tion.256
A. Circuit Court Decisions Holding that Administrative Notice by the
BIA Without an Opportunity to Respond Does Not Violate
the Due Process Clause
A majority of U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that the BIA
does not violate an alien's due process rights by denying asylum
253. Compare Getachew v. INS, No. 92-70836, 1994 U.S. App. WL 234557 (9th Cir.
June 2, 1994) and de la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 1994) and Kah-
ssai v. INS, 16 F.3d 323 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) and Sarria-Sibaja v. INS, 990 F.2d
442 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) and Gomez-Vigil v. INS, 990 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1993)
,(per curiam) and Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1993) and Castillo-Villagra v.
INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992) (all holding that BIA administrative notice of
change in government of applicant's native country without warning to and adequate
rebuttal from asylum applicant violates due process) with Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d
26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993) and Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS,
954 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1992) and Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1991) and
Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -., 112 S. Ct. 583
(1991) (all holding that BIA administrative notice of change of government in appli-
cant's native country does not violate due process where applicant may challenge no-
ticed facts in motion to reopen).
254. Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -., 113 S. Ct.
1943 (1993); Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Rivera-Cruz v. INS,
948 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1991); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, -
U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 583 (1991). The First Circuit agreed in dicta with the approach of
these appellate courts. Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28,. 38 (1st Cir. 1993).
255. De la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 1994); Sarria-Sibaja v.
INS, 990 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1993); Gomez-Vigil v. INS, 990 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1993);
Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circuit agreed with
the approach of these circuit courts in an unpublished opinion. Ulloa v. INS, No. 91-
3028, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1991).
256. Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d.26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct.
1943 (1993); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.
Ct. 583 (1991).
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after taking administrative notice of a change in the governing
party in the applicant's home country.257 The Fifth Circuit,25
the Seventh Circuit,259 and the D.C. Circuit 26 ° have held that the
availability of a motion to reopen proceedings before the BIA
ensures that the alien has a fair hearing on a request for asy-
lum. 26' These courts all agree that an alien is constitutionally
entitled to rebut facts administratively noticed by the BIA. 262
However, this opportunity does not have to be provided before
the BIA renders a decision on the alien's appeal.263  Rather,
these appellate courts assume that a rebuttal can be accom-
plished during a motion to reopen proceedings before the
BIA.
2 6 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
was the first circuit court to rule on whether the BIA's denial of
asylum, after administrative notice of a government change, vio-
lated the Due Process Clause. 65 In Kaczmarczyk v. INS, the Sev-
257. Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct.
1943 (1993); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.
Ct. 583 (1991); Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1991); Gutierrez-Rogue v.
INS, 954 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (all holding BIA administrative notice of change of
government in applicant's native country does not violate due process where applicant
may challenge noticed facts in motion to reopen).
258. Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1991).
259. Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct.
1943 (1993); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.
Ct. 583 (1991).
260. Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
261. Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 34; Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 597; Rivera-Cruz, 948
F.2d at 968; Gutierrez-Rogue, 954 F.2d at 773.
262. Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 33-34; Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 596; Rivera-Cruz, 948
F.2d at 968; Gutierrez-Rogue, 954 F.2d at 773.
263. Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 34; Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 597; Rivera-Cruz, 948
F.2d at 968; Gutierrez-Rogue, 954 F.2d at 773. The Fifth Circuit found that an alien's
objection to administrative notice of a change in government was premature. Rivera-
Cruz, 948 F.2d at 967. The court held that an alien's objection to the BIA's use of
administrative notice should be raised first in a motion to reopen before the court even
considered the issue. Id.
264. Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 34; Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 597; Rivera-Cruz, 948
F.2d at 968; Gutierrez-Rogue, 954 F.2d at 773; see supra notes 174-90 and accompanying
text (describing motion to reopen procedure).
265. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. -, 113 S. Ct.
1943 (1993). Other U.S. circuit courts had previously ruled on the appropriateness of
BIA administrative notice. See, e.g., Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1991); Wojcik
v. INS, 951 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1991). The Seventh Circuit, however, was the first U.S.
circuit court to rule on a due process challenge to this method of recognizing a change
in the government of an alien's home country. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993).
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enth Circuit upheld the BIA's use of administrative notice of a
change in Poland's government to deny asylum to former mem-
bers of the Polish trade union, Solidarity.266 The court consoli-
dated the appeals of three former Solidarity members who com-
plained that their arrests or detentions, by Polish police, were on
account of their membership in Solidarity and their participa-
tion in anti-government rallies or labor strikes.267 The three
men claimed that they feared persecution on account of their
political beliefs.2
Initially, an IJ denied all three men asylum and refused to
withhold their deportation. The men then appealed to the
BIA. 69 In all three cases, the BIA took administrative notice of
the fact that in September, 1989, Solidarity joined the Commu-
nist Party in a coalition government in Poland and that Solidar-
ity's members were no longer being persecuted by Polish author-
ities for their affiliation with the trade union. 270 The BIA, as a
result of the developments in Poland, concluded that none of
the three petitioners had a "well-founded fear" of persecution if
they were returned to Poland.271
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioners argued
that the BIA denied them their due process right to a fair hear-
ing.2 72 The petitioners noted that the Communist Party still con-
trolled the Polish military and police.2 73 The petitioners claimed
that when the BIA decided their appeals on the basis of informa-
tion that was not in the record, they were denied a fair hear-
266. Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 591.
267. Id. at 591-92.
268. Id. at 591.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -., 113 S. Ct.
1943 (1993).
272. Id. at 595. The court rejected arguments that administrative notice by the
BIA was too broad and amounted to an "across-the-board denial of all Polish asylum
claims." Id. at 593. Administrative agencies can take administrative notice of commonly
acknowledged facts, and the court found that the BIA's conclusion that Solidarity mem-
bers faced an insignificant risk of persecution in Poland was a commonly acknowledged
fact. Id. at 594.
The court also rejected a second argument from the petitioners that § 7(e) of the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e), requires the BIA to allow them an opportunity to rebut noticed
facts. Id. The court held that the APA is not applicable to deportation proceedings
under the INA, and because asylum claims initiated as part of the deportation process
are part and parcel of that process, the APA rebuttal requirement is not applicable. Id.
273. Id. at 594.
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The Seventh Circuit agreed that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment required that the petitioners be allowed
an opportunity to rebut officially noticed facts. 275 The court
held that this finding is particularly appropriate when the ad-
ministratively noticed facts are crucial to the outcome of the ad-
ministrative proceeding.276 The court stated that if it had held
that the petitioners were not entitled to rebut officially noticed
facts, it would have sanctioned the use of an "unregulated back
door" through which non-record evidence might be used to
deny asylum requests-with no response from the alien. 277
The court held, however, that the BIA did not violate the
petitioner's right to a fair hearing by rendering a decision on the
basis of administratively noticed facts.2 7 8 According to the Sev-
enth Circuit, the availability of a motion to re-open the BIA pro-
ceeding after the BIA renders a decision, but before deporta-
tion, is constitutionally sufficient to satisfy the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 279 This mechanism, the court
reasoned, provides an asylum applicant with sufficient opportu-
nity to present the BIA with evidence that the facts it officially
noticed are incorrect or that they are true but irrelevant to the
alien's case.28 ° Although the regulations governing a motion to
reopen do not refer to official notice, the court held that a mo-
tion to reopen satisfies the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 281
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the motion to reo-
pen does not stay the execution of an order of deportation. 82
The court, however, assumed that the BIA would exercise its dis-
cretion to stay the execution of a deportation order while the
274. Id. at 593
275. Id. at 596.
276. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct.
1943 (1993).
277. Id. As the Seventh Circuit explained, "not to allow petitioners an opportunity
to rebut noticed facts would sanction the creation of an unregulated back door through
which unrebuttable, non-record evidence could be introduced against asylum petition-
ers outside of the statutorily-mandated hearing context." Id.
278. Id. at 596-97.
279. Id. at 597.
280. Id.
281. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 596-97 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -'
113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993).
282. Id.
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motion is pending before the BIA.283 In addition, the court rea-
soned that a denial of a motion to reopen may be appealed to
the Court of Appeals, and judicial review will ensure that BIA
decisions taking official notice will not deprive aliens of their
right to a fair asylum proceeding.284 The reasoning of
Kaczmarczyk was applied in other Seventh Circuit cases, including
appeals brought by Nicaraguans denied asylum after the election
of a new President in February 1990.285 In addition, the Fifth
and District of Columbia Circuits rejected similar challenges to
the BIA's use of official notice.286 These circuits have relied on
Kaczmarczyk to uphold BIA official notice of a change in the Nic-
araguan government to deny asylum requests before the aliens
were permitted to respond.28 7
B. Circuit Court Decisions Holding That Administrative Notice by the
BIA, Without An Opportunity to Respond, Violates the Fifth
Amendment
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the
Tenth Circuit have held that asylum applicants are denied due
process when the BIA takes administrative notice of a change in
government, in the applicant's home country, without allowing
them an opportunity to respond before the BIA issues a deci-
sion. 88 Specifically, the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits have
found that the BIA should have forewarned aliens of their ad-
ministrative notice of a change in government, allowing them an
opportunity to respond before a decision was rendered.2 9 The
Tenth Circuit also concluded that the appeal to the BIA con-
sisted entirely of form language and deprived the petitioners of
an individualized determination of their asylum claim, which vio-
283. Id. at 597 n.9. "There... exists the possibility that unsuccessful asylum appli-
cants may be ordered to leave the country before the Board has ruled on their motions
to reopen." Id.
284. Id.
285. Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct.
1943 (1993).
286. Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 968 (5th Cir. 1991); Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS,
954 F.2d 769, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
287. Rivera-Cruz, 948 F.2d at 968; Gutierrez-Rogue, 954 F.2d at 773.
288. Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1031 (9th Cir. 1992); de la Liana-Cas-
tellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1100 (10th Cir. 1994).
289. Castillo-Vilagra, 972 F.2d at 1031; Llana-Castellon, 16 F.3d at 1100.
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lated their Fifth Amendment rights. 290
1. The Castillo-Villagra v. INS Decision
In the first ruling of its kind, the Ninth Circuit, in Castillo-
Villagra v. INS,29 1 held that the BIA's use of administrative notice
to deny asylum to three Nicaraguan citizens violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.29 2 In Castillo-Villagra,
the appellate court held that the BIA failed to provide due pro-
cess when it dismissed an appeal for asylum solely on the ground
that a new President was elected in Nicaragua without allowing
the applicants an opportunity to respond. 293  Teresa de Jesus
Castillo-Villagra and her two adult daughters sought asylum on
the basis of their membership in a political group that opposed
the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua294 and their participation in
various anti-government demonstrations.2 95 A U.S. State Depart-
ment report on conditions in Nicaragua supported claims of
Sandinista persecution of political opponents. 296
An IJ denied the three women's applications for asylum. 297
The IJ found that one of the women was not a credible witness
290. Llana-Castellon, 16 F.3d at 1098.
291. 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992).
292. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1029.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1021. The women claimed to be members of the Movimiento
Democratico Nicaraguense (the "MDN"). Id. at 1022.
295. Id. at 1021-22. In a hearing before an U, Castillo-Villagra's oldest daughter,
Maria Auxiliadora Aleman-Castillo, testified that their home in Jinotega was stoned
about ten times by mobs of 20 to 50 people because of the family's political opinions
and activities. Id. All three women claimed they were denied food coupons and were
arrested because of their support for MDN. In the Matter of Teresa de Jesus Castillo-
Villagra, No. A26 944 955-957 (Immigration Judge, Feb. 1, 1988) (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal).
296. JT. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS FOR
1984, S. REP. No. 99-6, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 609 (1985). According to the U.S. State
Department report on conditions in Nicaragua at the time, the Sandinistas used party
organizations as part of its intelligence and security network. Id. at 614. Specifically,
[The Sandinistas] rely on organizations controlled by the Sandinista National
Liberation Front, such as the ubiquitous 'block committees,' to help imple-
ment their policies at the local level and exert control, instill loyalty and to
identify and implement sanctions against suspected opponents. Using both its
own powers and intimidation by Sandinista organizations, the Government sys-
tematically harassed opposition political parties.
Id.
297. In the Matter of Teresa de Jesus Castillo-Villagra, No. A26 944 955-957 (Immi-
gration Judge, Feb. 1, 1988) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). Id.
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and that the women were not persecuted on account of their
membership in a political party nor their disagreement with
Sandinista policies.298 The women appealed the IJ's decision to
the BIA.2 99 On appeal, the BIA did not review the IJ's credibility
determinations nor the IU's decision that these three applicants
lacked a well-founded fear of persecution.0 0 Instead, the BIA
took administrative notice that an anti-Sandinista coalition took
power in Nicaragua on April 25, 1990, and denied the family's
appeal. 01 The BIA held that, regardless of whether they origi-
nally had a well-founded fear of persecution, these anti-
Sandinista asylum applicants were no longer threatened with
persecution because the Sandinistas were ousted from power in
Nicaragua.302 The BIA decided this case solely on the basis of
administrative notice of the change in the Nicaraguan govern-
ment.30 3 The women thereafter sought review by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 0 4
On appeal, Castillo-Villagra and her daughters did not chal-
lenge the BIA's use of administrative notice to recognize the
change in Nicaragua's government.30 5 Rather, they claimed that
the BIA deprived them of due process by taking administrative
notice of the change without prior warning and without allowing
298. Id. at 6. The IJ noted that one of the women said she was arrested at a dem-
onstration, but her application said she was arrested at someone's home. Id. The IJ
ruled that the rock throwing of the "so-called mobs" did not amount to persecution. Id.
at 9. Because of a lack of documentary corroboration, the IJ also doubted that the
women were active in MDN affairs. Id. at 8.
299. In re Castillo-Villagra, No. A26 944 955 (BIA Sept. 21, 1990) (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 2; see also Mark A. Uhlig, Chamorro Takes Nicaragua Helm, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1990, at Al. The BIA resolved a "large number" of other cases in the same
manner. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1023.
302. In re Castillo-Villagra, No. A26 944 955, at 2 (BIA Sept. 21, 1990) (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal). According to the BIA: "Given that the Sandinista
party no longer governs Nicaragua, under the present circumstances we do not find
that the record now before us supports a finding that the respondents have a well-
founded fear of persecution by the Sandinista government were they to return to Nica-
ragua." Id.
303. Id.; see Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1023 ("The Board gave no reasons for its
decision except for the facts of which it took administrative notice.").
304. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1017.
305. Id. at 1025. None of the courts upholding the BIA's us of administrative
notice have found it improper for the BIA to notice a change in the government of an
alien's home country. See, e.g., de la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th
Cir. 1993); Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1027.
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them an opportunity to respond.0 6 They claimed that despite
the change in government in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas still
controlled the police and the army, retaining the power to perse-
cute their political adversaries.3 0' The Ninth Circuit reversed
the BIA, vacated the INS deportation order, and remanded the
case to the BIA for further proceedings.0 8
306.. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1025.
307. Id. Other aliens challenging the BIA's administrative notice of a change of
government in their home countries have argued similarly. See Gomez-Vigil, 990 F.2d at
1113; supra text accompanying note 273 (noting that Communist Party continued to
control Polish military and police when BIA took administrative notice of change in
Poland's government in Kaczmarczyk); see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text
(noting that aliens retain fear of persecution despite change in the government of their
native countries). In Castillo-Villagra, the court found that the petitioners' fears of con-
tinued persecution were plausible. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1030. Specifically,
[t]he record they developed before the election allowed for the conclusion
that Nicaragua had been dominated by the Sandinista party, and that
Sandinista power flowed from the party, not just the government. It may be
that the party's permeation of society enables it to persecute opponents, even
with the presidency and some departments of government in other hands.
Id.
308. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1031. In addition to 'eviewing BIA use of admin-
istrative notice, the Court of Appeals rejected INS arguments that the petitioners lacked
jurisdiction since they had not exhausted their administrative remedies. Id. at 1023-25.
The INS claimed the petitioners could have moved to reopen on the ground that ad-
ministrative notice should not have been taken and that they cannot raise this issue for
the first time in a petition for judicial review. Id. at 1023. The court noted that aliens
cannot obtain judicial review until they have exhausted all administrative remedies
available "as of right." Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § ll05a(c)). The court observed, however,
that immigration regulations provide that the BIA "may" reopen. Id. This remedy is
discretionary, the court held, and not available "as of right." Id. Therefore, exhaustion
of the motion to reopen is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for review by the Court of
Appeals. Id.; see INS v. Doherty, - U.S. -_, 112 S. Ct. 719, 724 (1992) (noting that "the
granting of a motion to reopen is thus discretionary" and "disfavored").
The Court of Appeals also rejected arguments that exhaustion of the motion to
reopen should be required as matter of prudence in order to develop a proper record.
Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1024. "The BIA decision makes development of a further
record irrelevant, because it is undisputed that the petitioners claim to be anti-
Sandinista Nicaraguans, and that was the only fact that mattered." Id.
The court also determined that the BIA's use of administrative notice must be
analyzed under the INA, not the APA. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1025. Although the
APA would bar administrative notice in the circumstances of this case, the APA provides
that statutes adopted after the enactment of the APA shall not be deemed to modify it
"except to the extent that it does so expressly." Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1988). The INA
includes a fairly detailed procedural framework, the court observed, as well as a provi-
sion that makes it the "sole and exclusive procedure" on the deportation of aliens.
Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1025; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). "We conclude that the INA
displaces the APA on this question, so we do not analyze the administrative notice issue
under the APA." Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1025; see Ardestani v. INS, - U.S. -, 117
S. Ct. 515 (1991); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
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In a unanimous decision, the court held that the aliens were
not given a fair opportunity to be heard and were denied proce-
dural due process by the BIA.3°9 The petitioners, the Ninth Cir-
cuit said, might have been able to show the BIA 'that conditions
in Nicaragua were too complex, unsettled, and particularized for
the BIA to conclude that they could not have a well-founded fear
of persecution.310 In Castillo-Villagra, the Ninth Circuit proposed
a broad "rule of convenience" for the application of administra-
tive notice,3 1' allowing administrative judges to take notice of ad-
judicative facts whenever they know of information that will be
useful in rendering a decision.3 1 2 The court found that an "es-
sential concomitant" of this rule was an opportunity for the ap-
plicant to respond to the noticed facts. 31 3 Therefore, the court
ruled, the only practical way to handle questions such as whether
to take administrative notice or allow rebuttal of the facts so no-
ticed is to give an agency such as the BIA discretion to make
these determinations. 1 4
Furthermore, the court found that agency decisions on
these matters are subject to review for abuse of discretion.31 5 An
agency's discretion must be exercised in such a way as to be fair
under the circumstances.316 For example, the court ruled that
the BIA does not have to provide an asylum applicant an oppor-
tunity to rebut administrative notice that a new government has
been formed in his country of origin because this is a legislative
fact that is indisputable and general.3 17 The INS, however,
should have warned the parties that it intended to take adminis-
trative notice of the fact that any well-founded fear of persecu-
tion the applicants might have had before the change of govern-
309. Castillo-ViUagra, 972 F.2d at 1029.
310. Id.
311. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1027-28; see Banks v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 637 (9th
Cir. 1981) (administrative law judge could properly take notice of how social security
office personnel ordinarily dealt with inquiries such as those claimant made in denying
his entitlement to benefits).
312. Castilo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1027-28.
313. Id. at 1028.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. The court referred to several factors that may be used when determining
whether an agency abused its discretion. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1028-29 n.5 (quot-
ing Kenneth C. Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 932 (1980)); see supra
note 236 (listing factors).
317. Castio-ViUagra, 972 F.2d at 1029.
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ment was eliminated by the change in government.318 By alert-
ing the parties to this intention, the petitioners would have had
the opportunity to challenge the facts administratively no-
ticed. 1 9
In Castillo-Villagra, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the re-
liance that other circuit courts placed on an alien's right to re-
but administratively noticed facts in a motion to reopen was in-
sufficient.3 20 The court observed that the filing of a motion to
reopen does not automatically stay an order of deportation.32'
Therefore, the INS could make a motion to reopen moot by de-
porting the alien before the BIA rules on the motion. 22 The
court refused to assume, as other circuits had, 3  that the BIA
would voluntarily stay deportation until the BIA decided the
alien's motion to reopen.3 2 4 The BIA has broad discretion to
deny motions to reopen, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, and an
alien would therefore not be protected from deportation during
the pendency of a motion to reopen.325
2. Other Ninth Circuit Decisions
In subsequent asylum cases, the Ninth Circuit elaborated on
the inadequacy of the motion to reopen. 26 In a concurring
opinion in Gomez-Vigil v. INS, Circuit Court Judge Betty B.
Fletcher wrote that the plain language of the regulations gov-
erning motions to reopen made this an inappropriate means of
responding to officially noticed facts.3 27 These regulations re-
quire the introduction of new evidence, previously unavailable,
before a motion to reopen would be granted.328 Judge Fletcher
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1030; see supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (noting that motion
to reopen will not stay deportation or exclusion order).
322. CastiUlo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1030; see supra notes 159-60 and accompanying
text (noting that motion to reopen will not stay deportation or exclusion order).
323. See, e.g., Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 597, n.9 (assuming that BIA would stay de-
portation pending decision on motion to reopen).
324. Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1030.
325. Id.
326. See Gomez-Vigil v. INS, 990 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1993).
327. Id. at 1123-25; see supra notes 175-96 and accompanying text (describing mo-
tion to reopen BIA proceedings).
328. Id. at 1124; see supra note 176 and accompanying text (describing require-
ment of new evidence for motion to reopen).
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found that aliens seeking asylum from countries where the gov-
ernment has changed are not offering new evidence. 29 Rather,
these aliens seek to reiterate their original claims of a well-
founded fear of persecution.33 Specifically, these aliens claim
that the persecutors, who threatened them before the change in
government, remain in power and continue to threaten them
with persecution. 331 According to Judge Fletcher, these aliens
seek to rebut administratively noticed facts with factual state-
ments that argue continuity with the past, not change requiring
new facts.3 32 By definition, Judge Fletcher wrote, this evidence is
not new within the meaning of federal regulations governing
motions to reopen. 33
The immigration regulations also require that the new evi-
dence, submitted as part of a motion to reopen, be unavailable
or unpresentable at the time the BIA hears an appeal. 334 How-
ever, Judge Fletcher found that the new facts that aliens will
often seek to introduce via the motion to reopen are not unavail-
able, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the time of the BIA
review.335 In Gomez-Vigil, the facts were not only available, but
were initially presented to the BIA for its review. 36 Therefore,
Judge Fletcher wrote that the aliens, seeking to rebut administra-
tive notice of a change in government, were unable to satisfy the
requirement of presenting facts that were unavailable, undiscov-
ered, or unpresentable. 3 7
Finally, Judge Fletcher observed that the motion to reopen
was inadequate because this procedure did not allow for the di-
rect review of administratively noticed facts. 33" Aliens seeking to
respond to administrative notice of political developments in
their home countries need to introduce additional facts that re-
quire live testimony or oral argument. 339 In contrast, motions to
329. Gomez-Vigil, 990 F.2d at 1124.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See supra notes 169-90 and accompanying text (describing requirements of
motion to reopen).
335. Gomez-Vigil, 990 F.2d at 1125.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1124.
339. Id.
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reopen are usually decided without a hearing and serve only a
limited screening function.140 Due to the abbreviated nature of
the motion to reopen procedure, Judge Fletcher found this
method of responding to administrative notice inadequate.3 4'
2. The Tenth Circuit Adopts Castillo-Villagra
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Castillo-Villagra was
adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 42
In De la Llana-Castellon v. INS, the BIA affirmed an IJ's denial of
asylum solely on the basis of administrative notice of the election
in Nicaragua."' The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the
BIA was required to give the family of Nicaraguans seeking asy-
lum prior warning of administrative notice of elections in Nica-
ragua and an opportunity to be heard on these facts. 44 In addi-
tion, the Llana-Castellon court found that the BIA's use of the
same form language, in several asylum decisions, deprived aliens
of the individualized review of the facts required by due pro-
cess.
345
The Tenth Circuit found that the BIA's. use of form
paragraphs, identical to those used in other cases, deprived the
Nicaraguans of their Fifth Amendment rights.3 46  The court
highlighted a paragraph in the BIA's decision that nearly repli-
cated the language used in other cases."4 7 The BIA's decision,
according to the Tenth Circuit, contained no indication that it
had conducted an individual examination of the evidence
presented by the asylum applicants. 34  Specifically, the Llana-
340. Id.; Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1985); Reyes v. INS,
673 F.2d 1087, 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1982).
341. Gomez-Vigil, 990 F.2d at 1124; Moran-Enriquez v. INS, 884 F.2d 420, 423 n.2
(9th Cir. 1989). Judge Fletcher also noted that a motion to reopen places a higher
burden on an alien by requiring a prima facie showing of eligibility for asylum. Gomez-
Vigil, 990 F.2d at 1124; seeJames C. Frasher & Xuan T. Tran, Note, Administrative Notice
in Political Asylum Appeals: Does the Motion to Reopen Preserve the Alien's Due Process Rights?,
69 NoTmE DAME L. REv. 311, 326-27 (1993).
342. De la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 1994).
343. Id. at 1095.
344. Id. at 1099.
345. Id. at 1098.
346. Id.
347. Id. The Tenth Circuit observed, "that the paragraph containing the BIA's
administratively noticed facts is nearly a verbatim copy of those employed in other
cases." Id.
348. Id.; see supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text (explaining that aliens are
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Castellon court found that the BIA's decision could apply to al-
most any Nicaraguan alien seeking asylum.349 The court ob-
served that some elements of the BIA's decision had no applica-
tion to the petitioners. 350 The appearance of irrelevant facts in
the BIA's decision prompted the Tenth Circuit to conclude that
the BIA used administrative notice to dismiss the appeal without
conducting an individualized review.351 The Tenth Circuit held
that when the BIA's decision consists entirely of boilerplate lan-
guage, this decision is a denial of due process.35 2
III. THE APPROACH OF THE NINTH AND TENTH CIRCUITS
PROTECTS THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS OF DEPORTABLE ALIENS SEEKING
ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. Courts of Appeals that have examined the BIA's
use of administrative notice agree that an asylum seeker is consti-
tutionally entitled to present evidence to rebut the proposition
on which notice was taken.35 3 These courts have found that the
Fifth Amendment requires an alien to be allowed an opportunity
to be heard on officially noticed facts relied on to deny an asy-
lum request.354 Most courts assume that this rebuttal can be ac-
entitled to individualized determination of their case); see also Castillo-Villagra v. INS,
972 F.2d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 1992).
349. Llana-Castellon, 16 F.3d at 1098.
350. Id.
351. Id.; see Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26, 34 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993). The Court of Appeals noted that the BIA's disposition of cases
with decisions "employing identical, 'boilerplate' paragraphs regarding the effect of the
Nicaraguan election casts a cloud over the [BIA's] decisions and hinders meaningful
judicial review." Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 34.
352. Llana-Castellon, 16 F.3d at 1098. The Seventh Circuit has also noted that ad-
ministrative notice is not a substitute for an analysis of the facts of each applicant's
individual circumstances. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 594-95 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, - U.S. -. , 112 S. Ct. 583 (1991). The Seventh Circuit observed that aliens ap-
pealing a BIA decision are "right to demand that the BIA engage in a careful, individu-
alized review of the evidence presented in their applications and hearings."
Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 594-95.
353. See supra note 251 (listing cases finding that due process requires BIA to allow
aliens to respond to noticed facts). The Seventh Circuit noted that "not to allow peti-
tioners an opportunity to rebut noticed facts would sanction the creation of an unregu-
lated back door through which unrebuttable, non-record evidence could be introduced
against asylum petitioners outside of the statutorily-mandated hearing context."
Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 596.
354. See supra note 251 (listing cases finding that due process requires BIA to allow
aliens to respond to noticed facts).
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complished in the context of a motion to reopen the proceed-
ings. 35  However, a motion to reopen the proceedings is not an
adequate means of allowing an alien to respond to official notice
of a change in the home country's government.5 6 In addition,
this deprivation of due process is enhanced by the BIA's use of
nearly identical form language for all similarly situated aliens,
depriving them of an individualized determination of their eligi-
bility for asylum.357 By warning aliens of their intention to offi-
cially notice a change of government in the home country, the
BIA would provide an alien with the opportunity to respond in
accordance with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.358
A. The Motion to Reopen Proceedings Is Not an Adequate Means of
Allowing an Alien to Respond to Administrative Notice
A motion to reopen the proceedings is not an effective
method of allowing an alien to respond to official notice of a
change in the government of the home country.359 The plain
language of the immigration regulations, governing the motion
to reopen, makes this an inappropriate means of responding to
facts that have been previously administratively noticed by the
BIA.360 In addition, the filing of a motion to reopen will not stay
an order of deportation, and an alien may be deported before
the BIA rules on the motion.36 1 Finally, a motion to reopen
takes the place of a direct review and raises the burden of proof
355. See supra note 252 (listing cases discussing whether motion to reopen provides
constitutionally adequate opportunity to rebut noticed facts).
356. See supra notes 320-41 and accompanying text (describing inadequacy of mo-
tion to reopen).
357. See supra notes 346-52 and accompanying text (describing BIA use of form
language and due process deprivation).
358. See supra notes 318-19 and accompanying text (noting that Ninth Circuit ap-
proach allows pre-decision warning of administrative notice by BIA).
359. See supra notes 320-41 and accompanying text (describing inadequacy of mo-
tion to reopen).
360. See supra notes 326-37 and accompanying text (stating that plain language of
regulation makes it inappropriate means of rebutting noticed facts). Even courts up-
holding the BIA's use of administrative notice agree that the motion to reopen is not
designed as an opportunity to respond to officially noticed facts. See Gebremichael v.
INS, 10 F.3d 28, 39 n.29 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that motion to reopen was not designed
to permit response to administratively noticed facts).
361. See supra notes 320-25 and accompanying text (explaining that filing motion
to reopen will not stay deportation order).
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on an alien seeking asylum. 62
1. The Plain Language of Immigration Regulations Makes A
Motion to Reopen Inappropriate
The plain language of the federal regulations governing
motions to reopen before the BIA makes reliance on this mecha-
nism inappropriate. 63 In order to reopen asylum proceedings,
an alien's motion must supply new evidence that is material to
the asylum request.364 In addition, this new evidence must have
been unavailable and undiscovered or unpresentable at the time
the BIA reviewed the alien's claims. 365 The U.S. Supreme Court
has strictly interpreted the threshold requirements for reopen-
ing. 311 Only new evidence, according to the Court, that was pre-
viously unavailable and undiscovered or unpresentable on direct
review before the BIAjustifies a reopening. 6 7
Aliens seeking asylum from countries where the govern-
ment has changed are not offering new evidence. 36" Rather,
these aliens argue that the forces that threatened them before
the change in government remain in power and still threaten
them with persecution. 69 These aliens seek to rebut administra-
tively noticed facts with factual statements that are consistent
with evidence previously entered.370 The aliens want to seek re-
view of the same evidence that the BIA initially ignored when it
took administrative notice and denied their appeals.3 7 1 By defi-
nition, this evidence is not new within the meaning of federal
regulations governing a motion to reopen.372 The U.S. Supreme
Court has strictly interpreted the language of the regulation gov-
362. See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text (describing inadequacy of mo-
tion to reopen).
363. See supra notes 326-37 and accompanying text (stating that motion to reopen
procedure is not appropriate method of allowing an alien to respond to noticed facts).
364. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (explaining requirement of new
evidence for motion to reopen BIA proceedings).
365. Id.
366. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text (describing burden of proof
for motion to reopen BIA proceedings).
367. Id.
368. See supra notes 326-33 and accompanying text (explaining that aliens seeking
to rebut administrative notice of change in government are not offering new evidence).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
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erning motions to reopen BIA proceedings. 3  This literal read-
ing of the regulation prevents an interpretation that might make
the motion to reopen an appropriate mechanism for allowing
aliens to respond to administratively noticed facts.
37 4
2. Aliens May Be Deported Before the BIA Rules on a Motion
to Reopen in Violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution
A final order of deportation is not stayed by the filing of a
motion to reopen.375 While motions to reopen are pending
before the BIA, aliens may be deported to their home coun-
try.376 For this reason, the INS could make a motion to reopen
the BIA proceedings moot by deporting the applicant before the
motion is heard.377 Aliens with plausible asylum claims may
therefore be deported from the United States solely on the basis
of an administrative notice of a change in the government of
their home country. 8
While some circuit courts have assumed that the BIA would
use its authority to stay a deportation order during the pendency
of the alien's motion, 93 7  this assumption is debatable. 3 0 The
BIA has wide discretion to deny motions to reopen and has no
obligation to stay deportation while these motions are pend-
ing.38a In fact, the INS has acknowledged that aliens in this situ-
ation may be deported from the United States before they have
the opportunity to challenge administratively noticed facts.3"'
Without a stay of deportation, aliens would be deported before
373. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text (describing strict U.S. Supreme
Court interpretation of motion to reopen regulations).
374. Id.
375. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text (noting that motion to reopen
does 'not stay execution of deportation order).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text (describing Seventh Circuit's
assumption that BIA would 'stay deportation while motion to reopen is pending).
380. See supra notes 323-25 and accompanying text (describing Ninth Circuit re-
fusal to assume that BIA would stay deportation while motion to reopen is pending).
381. Id.
382. See Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d 142, (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that INS
declined to assure appellate court that petitioners would not be deported before con-
sideration of motion to reopen).
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the BIA rules on their motion to reopen in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.38 3
3. A Reopening Proceeding Cannot Replace Direct Review
A motion to reopen BIA proceedings is not an adequate
substitute for the direct review of an IJ's decision. 3 4 This pro-
ceeding will only address the propriety of the administrative no-
tice taken by the BIA. 85 When an alien is warned beforehand
that administrative notice will be taken, the applicant is able to
discuss the change of government during the direct review of
the IJ's rulings.386 Direct review before the BIA, by contrast, al-
lows an alien to argue the issues presented by a change in gov-
ernment, as well as other facts in the record, in a single hear-
ing.3 8' For this reason, direct review of the entire record is a
more efficient means of allowing an alien to respond to adminis-
tratively noticed facts. 8
In addition, aliens facing possible deportation have specific
factual issues that are best developed through live testimony and
oral argument rather than by briefing alone.3 89 Oral argument
before the BIA will allow an alien to respond to specific ques-
tions about the change in government and to describe fully the
390 Mtost
alien's well-founded fear of persecution. Motions to reopen,
however, are usually decided without oral argument and serve
only a limited screening function. 9 1 When a case requires oral
argument to fully establish all the facts, the abbreviated proce-
dure of the motion to reopen is inadequate. 9 2
383. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text (noting that motion to reopen
does not stay execution of deportation order).
384. See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text (describing inadequacy of mo-
tion to reopen).
385. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (describing requirements of
motion to reopen).
386. See supra notes 129-58 and accompanying text (describing appeals to the
BIA).
387. Id.
388. See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text (describing inadequacy of mo-
tion to reopen).
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
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4. A Motion to Reopen Raises the Burden of Proof an Alien
Must Meet
Aliens seeking to respond to administratively noticed facts
in a motion to reopen face a higher burden of proof than aliens
directly appealing an IJ's decision to the BIA.393 Aliens filing a
motion to reopen are required to meet the heavy burden of es-
tablishing a primafacie case for asylum eligibility. 394 This burden
is increased by the BIA's use of administrative notice to recog-
nize the change in government in the alien's home country.
395
In effect, the BIA has assumed that the alien does not have a
well-founded fear of persecution by taking administrative notice
of a change in government in an applicant's home country. 96
Any evidence supporting eligibility for asylum, therefore, will be
prejudiced by the prior finding of ineligibility.397
In effect, aliens in this situation must not only establish a
prima facie case, but they must also overcome the presumption
that they do not have a well-founded fear of persecution. 9 8
Where the alien has not had an opportunity to address the facts
the BIA relied on initially, the burden for eligibility for asylum is
difficult to overcome.399 If these aliens were permitted to ad-
dress the change of government in their countries on direct ap-
peal to the BIA, they would not be burdened with this prior pre-
400sumption.
B. Administrative Notice Through the Use of INS Form Language
Denies Aliens Individualized Determinations of Their
Asylum Claims as Required by the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
An alien is entitled to a deportation decision based on the
record created before and during the hearing. 401 Due process
393. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text (describing alien's burden of
proof for motion to reopen).
394. Id.
395. See supra note 249 (explaining that administrative notice is similar to pre-
sumption).
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text (describing procedural due
process rights of aliens).
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entitles aliens to an individualized determination of their asylum
claims4 2 and also requires that the decision-maker consider the
evidence and arguments that aliens present.40 3 The BIA has
taken administrative notice of a change in one country and de-
nied asylum applications from aliens from that country by the
use of nearly identical decisions for each applicant.40 4 In many
instances, the language of the BIA's decisions could apply to
nearly any alien seeking asylum from that country4 5 and some
elements of these decisions had no relevance to the parties in-
volved in the case.40 6 Under these circumstances, the uniformity
of these opinions indicates the rote application of administrative
notice to dismiss these appeals.40 7 This use of boilerplate lan-
guage indicates the rote application of administratively noticed
facts without an individual determination of the merits of an
alien's claim of asylum in violation of the Fifth Amendment.40
C. The BIA Should Warn Aliens Before Denying Asylum Solely on the
Basis of Administrative Notice of a Change in the
Government of the Aliens' Home Country
The BIA should warn aliens of its intention to dispose of
their appeals solely on the basis of changes in the government of
their home countries.4 0 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Castillo-Villagra has adopted a flexible rule that
allows the BIA to use its discretion to decide whether to take
administrative notice, whether to allow the parties to respond,
and whether the parties must be notified in advance that notice
will be taken.410 Under this approach, the BIA is not required to
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. See supra notes 346-52 and accompanying text (describing BIA use of form
opinions for large number of aliens seeking asylum).
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. See supra notes 318-19 and accompanying text (describing Ninth Circuit ap-
proach of warning aliens before administrative notice is taken).
410. See supra notes 310-14 and accompanying text (describing Ninth Circuit ap-
proach of warning aliens before administrative notice is taken). Despite the suggestion
by one federal appeals court judge that Castillo-Villagra requires advance notice in all
instances of administrative notice, see Gomez-Vigil, 990 F.2d at 1114, 1120-21 (AldisertJ.,
concurring), the holding in Castillo-Villagra makes clear that the BIA may use its own
discretion to decide whether to notify the parties in advance that administrative notice
1003
1004 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 17:955
warn an alien every time it takes administrative notice of a
change in the alien's home country.411 In those instances where
the change in an applicant's home country is only one of several
factors relied upon by the BIA, a pre-decision warning that ad-
ministrative notice will be used may be unnecessary.41 2 In addi-
tion, where an alien has addressed a change in government in
proceedings before an IJ, there is no need for a warning that the
BIA intends to, take administrative notice of the same change in
government.413 Under the Ninth Circuit approach, the BIA is
required to warn an alien when it intends to rely solely on ad-
ministrative notice of a recent change in the government of the
alien's native country before ruling on the request for asylum.4 14
By warning aliens of its intention to administratively notice a
change of government in their home countries, the BIA would
provide aliens with a predecision opportunity to respond to ad-
ministratively noticed facts and would avoid the shortcomings of
the motion to reopen. 41 5 Therefore, the BIA would avoid the
possibility that aliens will be deported before having an opportu-
nity to respond to administratively noticed facts.41 6
CONCLUSION
The BIA violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment by denying asylum requests solely on the basis of
administratively noticed facts to which the alien has not had an
opportunity to respond. Aliens must be given an adequate op-
portunity to challenge or supplement evidence concerning the
will be taken and even whether rebuttal need be permitted at all. Castillo-Villagra, 972
F.2d at 1028; Gomez-Vigil, 990 F.2d at 1123 (Fletcher, J., concurring). As the Castillo-
Villagra court observed, "[tihere is no need to allow rebuttal of the fact that water does
not run uphill." Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1023.
411. Id.
412. See Castillo v. INS, 951 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1991) (BIA decision will be upheld
if supported by substantial evidence); see supra note 246 (noting that if there is other
evidence in record that substantially supports BIA's decision, improper use of adminis-
trative notice will not cause reversal); cf Sarria-Sibaja v. INS, 990 F.2d 442, 444 (9th Cir.
1993) (reversing BIA ruling when BIA did not state alternative basis for decision).
413. See Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 1993) (objection to adminis-
trative notice dismissed where petitioners had ample opportunity to address change in
Polish government before IJ); see also Matter of H-M et al., Interim Decision 3204 (BIA
Aug. 11, 1993).
414. See supra notes 310-14 and accompanying text (describing Ninth Circuit ap-
proach to administrative notice by BIA).
415. Id.
416. Id.
1994] NOTICE, DUE PROCESS, AND ASYLUM CLAIMS
political situation in their home countries because these changes
may not automatically eliminate an alien's well-founded fear of
persecution. A motion to reopen, made after the BIA has ren-
dered a decision, is not an adequate means of allowing an alien
to respond to administrative notice, as some U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals have held. The plain language of immigration regulations
makes a motion to reopen inappropriate because an alien may
be deported before the BIA rules on the motion. A motion to
reopen proceeding is an inadequate substitute for direct review
of the facts underlying a deportation order and raises the bur-
den of proof an alien must meet. In addition, the BIA's rote
application of administratively noticed facts has deprived aliens
of their due process rights. The BIA should adopt the Ninth and
Tenth Circuit approach, which warns aliens before a decision is
rendered on their asylum claims solely on the basis of adminis-
trative notice of changes in the governments of their home
countries.
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